






Fact inferences made by the trial judge are the lynchpin of civil 
litigation. If inferences were a matter of universally held logical 
deductions, this would not be troubling. Inferences, however, are 
deeply contestable conclusions that vary from judge to judge. 
Non-conscious psychological phenomena can lead to flawed 
reasoning, implicit bias, and culturally influenced perceptions. 
Inferences differ significantly, and they matter. Given the 
homogeneous makeup of the judiciary, this is a significant concern.  
This Article will demonstrate the ubiquity, importance, and 
variability of inferences by examining actual cases in which trial 
and appellate (or majority and dissenting) judges draw quite 
different inferences from the same record. It will then review the 
psychological literature to show ways in which judges are affected 
by unconscious forces. It concludes by suggesting reforms to judicial 
education, use of decision mechanisms that promote conscious 
deliberation, and civil procedure rule changes designed to increase 
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 “[T]he test for determining whether an inference (from 
circumstantial evidence) is a rational one is stated in terms of 
mathematical precision but is one which allows the very 
greatest latitude in actual application. . . . [T]he authoritative 
language of nice and scientific precision in which such 
conclusions are cast is after all only the language of delusive 
exactness.” – Fleming James, Jr.1 
“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the 
less, we can never see them with any eyes except our own.” 
– Benjamin Cardozo2 
Motivated cognition is “the ubiquitous tendency of people to 
form perceptions, and to process factual information generally, 
in a manner congenial to their values and desires.”  
– Dan M. Kahan3 
I. Introduction 
Inferences about facts are an integral and unavoidable part of 
civil litigation. As in life, much of what we “know” are conclusions, 
formed by drawing inferences from a collection of direct and 
circumstantial evidence. Juries, for example, are instructed that 
“[i]nferences are simply deductions or conclusions which reason 
and common sense lead the jury to draw from the evidence received 
in the case.”4 At trial, then, juries perform the intertwined 
 
        1. Fleming James, Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 
YALE L.J. 667, 673–74 (1949). 
 2.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (Steven 
A. Childress ed., Quid Pro Books 2010) (1921). 
 3.  Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and 
the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2012). 
 4.  KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1A FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 12:05 (6th ed. 
2019). 
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functions of deciding what evidence to believe, what inferences to 
draw (and not draw), and how the law applies to the facts it has 
found.5 
Trials, however, are not the only stage in which inferences 
play a role, and judges, rather than juries, consciously and 
unconsciously draw inferences that will shape the course of the 
litigation and the parties’ likelihood of success. This has long been 
recognized in the context of the pivotal pretrial rulings that take 
the case away from the jury: dismissals on the pleadings and 
summary judgment.6 Less obvious are the many other ways in 
which judges make decisions based on facts during the pretrial 
period, and the ways in which they employ inferences in doing so. 
Although they do not technically end litigation, decisions about 
issues such as discovery, joinder of claims and parties, and class 
action status can have an enormous impact on the viability and 
scope of litigation. Even decisions that are labeled as exercises of 
discretion rather than as fact finding are often undergirded by the 
judge’s belief about facts, and those beliefs are formed after 
drawing inferences. 
This Article will illuminate and critique the power of judicial 
inferences, and will conclude by suggesting some changes in 
training, process, and procedure rules that could improve the 
inference-drawing process.7 While much law review literature 
about inferences focuses on lawmaking, this Article will focus on 
fact finding; while much focuses on appeals, this Article will look 
at the pretrial stage. Trial judges’ myriad decisions are riddled 
with inferences, and their role in finding facts makes them the 
most important actors in influencing the course and outcome of 
lawsuits.8 Part II briefly defines “inference” as it is used in this 
 
 5.  In doing so, they will apply the applicable standard of proof, generally 
“preponderance of the evidence” in civil cases. See generally Kevin M. Clermont, 
Staying Faithful to the Standards of Proof, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(discussing the various standards of proof and their continued use in the legal 
system).  
 6.  See infra Part IV (illustrating judicial inferences in real cases including 
motions on pleadings and summary judgement).  
 7.  See infra Part V (discussing the ways judges use heuristics); see also infra 
Part VI (suggesting ways to improve the judicial system). 
 8.  This Article will focus on the federal courts and federal procedure, but 
the same arguments would apply to state courts. Indeed, since many state court 
judges are faced with much larger caseloads and far fewer resources, it is possible 
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Article and discusses the inference-drawing process. It highlights 
the powerful role of each judge’s own experience and world view in 
that process.  
The next two Parts document judges drawing pretrial 
inferences and show why that matters. Part III uses a hypothetical 
case to illustrate the types of pretrial decisions in which the trial 
judge’s choices about inferences can be decisive. Part IV takes the 
discussion from the theoretical into real courts and decisions. Both 
Parts demonstrate that judges may find different facts because 
they have chosen different inferences, even though dealing with 
the same record. 
After these Parts establish the pervasiveness of inferences and 
of the potential impact of disagreements, Part V brings together 
judicial decisions and psychological research. It begins by 
introducing the psychology and behavioral economics9 scholarship 
that describes the ways in which the human brain processes 
information and reaches decisions, including the use of 
heuristics.10 It then demonstrates that judges, like all other 
humans, are influenced in their thinking by factors such as 
heuristics, implicit biases, and cultural cognition.11 Nor does their 
combination of legal education, judicial experience, and judicial 
education overcome those effects in most cases.12 Further, 
 
that the need for fast decisions and tendency toward oral rather than written 
opinions would exacerbate the problems discussed in this Article. 
 9.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000). 
 10.  A “heuristic” is  
a mental shortcut that allows people to solve problems and make 
judgments quickly and efficiently. These rule-of-thumb strategies 
shorten decision-making time and allow people to function without 
constantly stopping to think about their next course of action. 
Heuristics are helpful in many situations, but they can also lead to 
cognitive biases. 
Kendra Cherry, Heuristics and Cognitive Biases, VERYWELL MIND 
https://perma.cc/L6G3-U4M2 (last updated July 26, 2019) (last visited Aug. 30, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 12.  Not only is the common cliché that judges just “call balls and strikes” 
inaccurate, some studies show that NBA referees and MLB umpires show implicit 
bias effects in their officiating. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the 
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1178 (2012) (discussing the various biases of 
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empirical studies linking judicial decisions with the judges’ own 
race and gender provide evidence that inferences may be especially 
problematic in cases where race, gender, and other characteristics 
are salient.13 Given the homogeneous makeup of the federal 
judiciary,14 this is a significant concern. 
Part VI suggests some reforms on individual and systemic 
levels that might improve judicial inferences: 1) provide judicial 
education designed to raise judges’ awareness of their own 
inference-making and increase their knowledge of the experiences 
and worldviews of others; 2) implement mechanisms that activate 
and facilitate deliberative mental processes; and 3) change the 
interpretation and application of the procedure rules to support 
rather than reject alternative inferences and decrease the impact 
of a single judge’s intuitions. Part VII concludes with overall 
lessons on recognizing and offsetting the inevitable impact of 
cognitive biases on fact finding. 
II. Defining “Inference” and Inference-Drawing 
The kind of inferences and inference-drawing discussed in this 
Article are what Black’s Law Dictionary refers to as an “inferential 
fact”—a “fact established by conclusions drawn from other 
evidence rather than from direct testimony or evidence; a fact 
derived logically from other facts.”15 That derivation goes beyond 
the literal limits of the testimony. As Professor Dan Simon has 
pointed out, “[a]n inference is typically defined as any cognitive 
process of reasoning, in which a person goes beyond some known 
data to generate a new proposition. The result of an inference, 
then, is the addition of information to the person’s mental 
representation of an issue.”16 For example, evidence might consist 
 
professional sports judges). 
 13.  See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An 
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117,  
1129–35 (2009) (summarizing multiple analyses concluding that judges’ race 
significantly affects outcomes in workplace racial harassment cases).  
 14.  See infra notes 402–419 and accompanying text (discussing the makeup 
of the federal judiciary). 
 15.  Inferential Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 16.  Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 42 (1998) (citing THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF COGNITIVE 
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of a properly authenticated videotape of a bank robbery showing 
the robber wearing a yellow rain hat as well as testimony from a 
police officer that a search of the defendant’s home produced a 
yellow rain hat (introducing into evidence the hat, which looks like 
the one on the video). An inference from that evidence might be 
that it is the same hat, and, further, that the defendant robbed the 
bank.17 
What is the process by which inferences are drawn or not 
drawn? Scholars describe it differently, but all recognize that 
inferences spring from the decisionmaker’s beliefs about the world, 
their “generalizations.”18 Rationalist evidence analysis looks at 
evidence and inferences as logical chains, considering each piece of 
evidence together with generalizations that are said to justify (or 
not justify) an inference.19  
Cognitive psychologists describe the fact-finding process, 
including inferences, as based on the construction of stories.20 
Their experiments show that jurors impose a narrative 
organization on trial evidence.21 The ways in which they do so 
 
PSYCHOLOGY 186 (Michael W. Eysenck ed., 1991) and Gilbert Harman, 
Rationality, in 3 AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE: THINKING 175, 184 
(Edward E. Smith & Daniel N. Osherson eds., 2d ed. 1995)). 
 17.  See id. (“Inferences are vectoral in character: they constitute some form 
of extension of datum towards some new knowledge, stated in the form of a 
preposition.”). 
 18.  See TERENCE ANDERSON, DAVID SCHUM & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF 
EVIDENCE 100 (William Twining & Christopher J. McCrudden eds., 2d ed. 2005) 
(“Every inference is dependent upon a generalization.”).  
 19.  See David H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the Perplexed, 28 
JURIMETRICS J. 161, 170–72 (1988) (noting that even under a mathematical model 
of reasoning such as Bayesian theory, the results are affected both by peoples’ 
prior beliefs and by the likelihood ratios they assign to new pieces of information). 
For a helpful chart showing the interaction of evidence and generalizations (and 
also the impact of information relevant to credibility decisions), see ANDERSON ET 
AL., supra note 18, at 61, Figure 2.5. 
 20.  See Reid Hastie, Introduction, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUROR DECISION MAKING 3, 24 (Reid Hastie, ed., 1993) (“[A] narrative structure is 
imposed on evidence as it is comprehended by a juror who is making a 
decision . . . .”). The story model may be a less helpful explanation in contexts that 
do not have much of a story structure. See also Dan Simon, Thin Empirics, 23 
INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 82, 83–85 (2019) (discussing the shortcomings of the story 
model). 
 21.  See Hastie, supra note 20, at 24 (“Pennington and Hastie’s empirical 
research supports the ‘psychological validity’ of story structures as descriptions of 
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require jurors to use their knowledge of the world—their 
generalizations—plus their knowledge about the expected 
structure of stories in reacting to trial evidence.22 “Analyses of 
inference chains leading to story events reveal that intermediate 
conclusions are established by converging lines of reasoning which 
rely on deduction from world knowledge, analogies to experienced 
and hypothetical episodes, and reasoning by contradiction.”23 
The judicial system’s confidence in generalizations is based on 
an assumption that judges and jurors share a body of knowledge 
that will make inferences fairly uniform.24 However, this 
assumption is problematic. 
This . . . is commonly described as “general experience,” 
“background knowledge,” “common sense,” or “society’s stock of 
knowledge.” . . . [W]e need to ask, whose experience, sense, or 
knowledge? . . . The bases for such generalizations are as varied 
as the sources for the beliefs themselves—education, direct 
experience, the media, gossip, fiction, fantasy, speculation, 
prejudice, and so on.25 
Judges, who like jurors operate by using human cognition, can 
be expected to use the same kind of evidence-generalization links 
to analyze inferences, and to be similarly dependent on their own 
experiences in forming, using, and analyzing generalizations.26 
 
jurors’ representations of evidence . . . .”).  
 22.  See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror 
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 525 (1991) (“Because 
all jurors hear the same evidence and have the same general knowledge about the 
expected structure of stories, differences in story construction must arise from 
differences in world knowledge.”). Although it was developed in the context of 
criminal cases, the applicability of the Story Model in at least some civil cases has 
been demonstrated by later research. See, e.g., Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, 
Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated Model of Juror Decision-
Making in Civil Litigation, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 45 (2003) (“[I]n sexual 
harassment cases, the story model of juror decision-making appears to be 
useful.”). For a recent examination of the story model, see generally Dominic 
Willmott et al., Introduction and Validation of the Juror Decision Scale (JDS): An 
Empirical Investigation of the Story Model, 57 J. CRIM. JUST. 26 (2018). 
 23.  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 22, at 524.  
 24.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 269 (“[I]t is assumed that the triers 
of fact, including jurors, come already equipped with a largely shared ‘stock of 
knowledge’ which is the main source of warrants for making inferences in 
arguments about questions of fact.”). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
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When judges draw inferences, or when they decide whether a 
reasonable jury could draw an inference, they are injecting not just 
logic but also their own store of generalizations into the mix.27 This 
is doubly important because the kind of reasoning involved in the 
inference process often operates intuitively.28 “The reasoner does 
not consciously identify the generalizations upon which her 
inferences depend.”29 
III. A Tale of Two Judges 
In order to make the impact of fact inferences clearer, consider 
the ways in which two different judges might react to pretrial 
issues raised in the same lawsuit. 
Two hypothetical judges, Judge A and Judge B, will rule on 
various motions. The point is not that one or the other judge is 
correct, but that their inferences may well vary significantly, with 
important consequences for the course of the litigation. For both of 
our hypothetical judges, the lawsuit begins with a complaint 
making the following allegations: 
Acme Motors designs, manufactures, and sells an all-electric 
car, called the Greeny, which debuted in 2012. The Greeny was very 
popular with eco-conscious buyers, and all was going well for a 
number of years. Unfortunately, in 2016 the older model Greeny 
cars began to have a problem. Drivers began to experience 
unintended acceleration—without warning the car accelerates, and 
braking will not stop it. 
Plaintiff David Driver purchased a new Greeny in 2013. He 
believes that this defect in his 2013 Greeny is what caused a horrible 
crash in 2017 that left him with persistent back pain, lost past 
income and future earning capacity, and unpaid medical bills. 
 
777, 821 (2001) [hereinafter Judicial Mind] (“Like the rest of us, [judges] use 
heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”).  
 27.  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 269 (explaining how triers of fact 
fall on background generalizations in the absence of experts or other direct 
evidence).  
 28.  See id. at 101 (“In most contexts, inductive reasoning operates 
intuitively.”).  
 29. Id. 
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Driver alleges that the unintended acceleration problem is caused 
by electronic failures and an inadequate fault detection system, and 
that a safer design would include a brake override system. His 
complaint asserts legal theories of negligence, product liability 
(defective design), and gross negligence, and he seeks both 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
Co-plaintiff Oscar Owner also purchased a new 2013 Greeny. 
He has not experienced the unintended acceleration problem or been 
injured, but he alleges that the value of his Greeny is dramatically 
lower than Acme represented due to this undisclosed defect and 
argues that Acme has breached its warranty and violated state 
consumer protection statutes by failing to disclose known problems 
with the car. He seeks compensation for the reduced resale value of 
his 2013 Greeny. 
Now consider a series of pretrial decisions and the ways in 
which inferences play a role.  
A. Motion to Dismiss 
Acme has denied all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and also alleges 
that Driver’s accident was caused by his own negligence. In 
addition, Acme has filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiffs fail to state a 
claim because they have not identified a specific defect responsible 
for unintended acceleration, and thus have not alleged sufficient 
facts to make plaintiffs’ claims plausible. 
Judge A denies the motion to dismiss, finding the allegations 
that the car unexpectedly accelerated and would not brake and 
that an alternative braking system would have stopped the car, to 
be facts rather than conclusions. Based on those pleaded facts, 
Judge A believes that inferences of negligence and defective design 
are at least as plausible as other inferences. In addition, Judge A 
believes that the complaint’s allegations that prior to 2013 other 
Greeny owners had complained to Acme about injuries from 
unintended acceleration are sufficient to support a plausible 
inference of gross negligence. With regard to Owner’s warranty 
claims, Judge A is satisfied that it is reasonable to infer a causal 
link between the pattern of unexpected acceleration and the 
decrease in resale value of Owner’s car. In summary, Judge A holds 
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that the plaintiffs’ complaint meets the requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and that Acme’s motion seeks more 
specificity than is required at the pleading stage.30  
Judge B is concerned that the complaint does little more than 
recite the elements required for negligence and design defect 
claims and treats many of the allegations as conclusions rather 
than facts. Even treating them as facts, Judge B is especially 
unconvinced by the inference that, based on customer complaints, 
Acme knew or should have known of a general problem with 
unintended acceleration. Judge B grants the motion to dismiss. 
Judge B does, however, grant plaintiffs leave to amend to identify 
more specifically the defect and safer alternative design and the 
sources of Acme’s knowledge of a pattern of unintended 
acceleration, as well as facts tying publicity about the acceleration 
to changes in used Greeny prices. 
B. Joinder of Parties and Claims 
Assume that both judges have allowed this suit to go forward. 
Acme has filed a motion to sever the claims of Driver and Owner, 
arguing that they do not arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.  
Judge A denies the motion. Judge A believes that some of the 
evidence of breach, defect, and causation that will support the 
inferences needed for the personal injury claims will also support 
a strong inference with respect to the decreased value of the 
Greeny, and that evidence of Acme’s knowledge (part of Driver’s 
gross negligence claim) will also support an inference of a knowing 
violation of the state’s consumer law. Based on his beliefs about 
the validity of those inferences from common evidence, Judge A 
concludes that there is both a logical relationship and significant 
evidentiary overlap between Driver’s and Owner’s claims. 
Judge B, on the other hand, grants the motion to sever. Judge 
B concludes that evidence about the nature of Acme’s design and 
knowledge of risks of harm has only a tangential relationship to 
 
 30. Cf. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1219–22 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (discussing whether the plaintiff adequately offered specific allegations of 
defect in Toyota’s electronic throttle control system). 
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the resale value of Greeny vehicles, because any inference that the 
nature of the defect affected the resale value is weak at best. 
Instead, Judge B believes that a plausible inference of loss of value 
would require proof of lowered resale prices immediately after the 
public claims about of the unintended acceleration problem 
(whether or not such a problem really exists). In the absence of 
plausible inferences from shared evidence, Judge B concludes that 
the requirements of Rule 20 have not been met. 
C. Discovery 
Initial disclosures have been made and formal discovery is 
now under way. For example, the plaintiffs have sent Acme a 
request for production of documents that includes a request for “all 
communications received by Acme from Greeny purchasers 
claiming that a Greeny car from model years 2012–15 experienced 
unintended acceleration.” (All parties agree that the Greeny’s 
design did not change in any relevant way during this time period.) 
Acme has objected that the request is irrelevant and asserted that 
the cost of compliance would be disproportionate. The parties have 
conferred but have been unable to reach agreement, so the 
plaintiffs have filed a motion to compel production of the requested 
documents. 
Judge A grants the motion to compel. Judge A sees a potential 
for reasonable inferences from other drivers’ experiences to 
plaintiffs’ claims. Judge A believes that the existence of other 
unintended acceleration accidents supports an inference that 
Driver’s car suffered from the same problem. In addition, the 
complaints themselves might show that Acme had been notified of 
a troubling pattern of malfunctions leading to injuries, which could 
support the inference required to prove gross negligence. Finally, 
thinks Judge A, the pattern of complaints might support an 
inference of the extent of the impact of the alleged defect on resale 
value. With regard to proportionality, because of Judge A’s 
assessment of the strength of the inference from other complaints 
to the elements of plaintiffs’ claims, the information sought is very 
important to resolving the issues. Judge A also infers from these 
two plaintiffs’ claims and the nature of the national car market 
that the Greeny’s safety issues may be causing nationwide 
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problems, making the issues at stake important and the overall 
amount in controversy quite large. Judge A believes from general 
experience that individual plaintiffs likely have fewer resources 
and less access to information than does Acme and that Acme has 
likely overstated the cost of compliance with this discovery request. 
All in all, Judge A concludes that the information sought is 
relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. 
Judge B’s approach is quite the opposite. Since Judge B 
granted the motion to sever, this version of the lawsuit includes 
only plaintiff Driver’s claims. Judge B believes that complaints 
from other Greeny owners support only a very weak inference, if 
any, about what happened to Driver’s car. Judge B thinks Driver 
will instead need to show plausible inferences from the evidence of 
the condition of Driver’s own car, the accident involving Driver, 
and evidence about Acme’s design of the 2013 vehicle. Nor does 
Judge B find an inference from complaint letters to gross 
negligence at all convincing. As to proportionality, Judge B (based 
on the assessment that the inferences are weak) believes that the 
requested complaints would not be at all important in resolving 
the liability issues. Although Judge B thinks a nationwide product 
defect could be significant, this discovery request is insufficiently 
tied to that, and the amount in controversy is limited to Driver’s 
own damages. While Acme has greater access to information, 
Judge B believes based on the judge’s experience as a lawyer and 
a judge that the plaintiffs’ lawyer is probably seeking discovery 
about other owners’ complaints primarily to run up Acme’s costs 
and to seek out other potential clients. Judge B’s conclusion: the 
inference from customer complaints to elements of Driver’s claims 
is so weak that it is only marginally relevant, and the cost of 
compliance far exceeds the needs of the case. Judge B denies the 
motion to compel. 
D. Summary Judgment 
It is difficult to frame a short but rich and realistic 
hypothetical on summary judgment. Note, though, that analysis of 
inferences will be critical to the resolution of a summary judgment 
motion. Assume that Acme has filed a motion for partial summary 
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judgment on Driver’s product liability claim, arguing that Driver 
will not have sufficient evidence to support an inference of 
defective design. In addition to the judges’ differing assessment of 
probability reflected in their rulings on the 12(b)(6) motion, 
assume that part of the summary judgment dispute will include a 
decision about whether plaintiff’s engineering expert satisfies the 
requirements of Daubert31 and will be allowed to testify. 
Even the decision about whether to allow an expert to testify 
requires evaluation of inferences. When the question is whether 
the inferences to which the expert wishes to testify meet the 
admissibility requirements of Daubert, judges as gatekeepers 
evaluate scientific inferences.32 The case-specific factual 
underpinnings of the expert opinion might also differ, depending 
on what information has been unearthed during discovery, and a 
judge might also reject the reliability of an expert’s inferences 
based on fewer bits of information, which in turn relates back to 
the discovery differences highlighted above. Judge A might 
ultimately rule that the expert’s testimony can be considered, 
while Judge B might rule that it cannot. 
It would not be surprising, then, if Judge A were to deny the 
summary judgment motion, finding that a reasonable jury could 
choose to draw the inferences needed for findings of design defect 
from the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence and expert testimony, 
and for Judge B to grant the motion, concluding that inferences of 
Acme’s liability are too weak in light of alternative inferences of 
Acme’s lack of fault and Driver’s contributory negligence. 
E. Putting it Together 
Looking at all of these pretrial decisions, one can see that 
inference-drawing across a series of pretrial rulings can have a 
tremendous influence on the course of litigation. It is clearest that 
 
 31.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) 
(holding that in determining whether to admit an expert witness’s scientific 
testimony, the trial judge should assess whether it is based on scientifically valid 
reasoning that can properly be applied to the facts at issue). 
 32.  See Margaret Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 19–21 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., 3d. ed. 
2011) (discussing the various considerations judges analyze when ruling on 
Daubert challenges). 
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judicial inferences play a decisive role in rulings on dispositive 
motions. However, inferences about facts also play a significant 
role in other procedural rulings, in ways that often lie beneath 
exercises of discretion and balancing tests.33 
This thought experiment, though, is an academic construct. 
Are inferences similarly pervasive in real cases? Part IV will use 
examples from actual litigation to highlight inferences at work in 
various pretrial contexts. And just as was true for the hypothetical 
dueling judges, real cases show judges finding different facts from 
the same record because they disagree about what inferences 
should be drawn. 
IV. Judicial Inferences in Real Life 
Real cases do not come in identical pairs for purposes of 
comparing inferences, but trial court decisions involving inferences 
are sometimes appealed, and the contrast between the trial court 
and appellate court decisions can turn, even in procedural rulings, 
on judges’ disagreements about the plausibility of inferences.34 
Similarly, appellate decisions with a dissent may reveal that 
judges on the panel have chosen different inferences, and hence 
 
 33.  Even though many such decisions would be reviewed on appeal using an 
“abuse of discretion” standard of review, the propriety of the exercise of discretion 
is intertwined with underlying fact finding, which in turn depends on the court’s 
inferences. See, e.g., Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135-DPJ-
FKB, 2014 WL 12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), vacated and remanded, 838 
F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing discovery orders); see also infra notes 
153– 179 and accompanying text (discussing Kuttner v. Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970 (7th 
Cir. 2016)). 
 34.  The cases highlighted in this Part were identified by searching the 
Westlaw “Federal District Courts” database for cases decided in the prior twelve 
months. I searched for cases on particular topics (e.g. discovery, summary 
judgment, class actions, etc.), and then read all of them to find examples of cases 
in which inferences played an important role. Within that set, I searched for cases 
that had been reversed on appeal, or for cases in which there was a dissent in the 
court of appeals. From those results, I chose cases that would be good illustrations 
of the impact of inferences. This does not claim to be either a random or 
comprehensive study. It would be interesting to see a more quantitative study, 
perhaps of all the cases decided in a particular district over a given time period. 
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different facts.35 This Part will examine some contrasting opinions 
as examples.  
A. Dispositive Motions 
The impact of inference is at its most obvious in rulings on 
dispositive motions—motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 12(b)(6)36 and motions for summary judgment. As with 
the hypothetical judges, the point is not that some judges are right 
and others are wrong, but that the same record can lead judges to 
opposite conclusions, based in large measure on the ways in which 
their “experience and common sense,” operating through 
unconscious heuristics and biases, guide their inferences.37 The 
 
 35.  See generally Suja Thomas, Reforming the Summary Judgment Problem: 
The Consensus Requirement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2018) (suggesting that 
fact-based summary judgment appeals with dissents should be treated as per se 
indications that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party). Decisions 
in the courts of appeal with dissents do show both inferences at play and judges 
who would choose different inferences from the same record. See, e.g., Tyree v. 
Foxx, 835 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (drawing different inferences about the 
relevance of decisions similar to, but distinct from, the one that affected the 
plaintiff); Fears v. Kasich (In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.), 845 F.3d 231 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (disagreeing about whether circumstantial evidence supports the 
inference that disclosure of the identity of a manufacturer of lethal injection drug 
would make it difficult for the state to acquire such drugs). 
 36.  There are a huge number of pleading cases in which inferences play a 
key role—not surprising since the word “inference” is baked into the legal test 
created by Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009). See, e.g., Johnson v. City of New York, 16-CV-6426(KAM)(VMS), 2018 WL 
1597393, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2018) (approving inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff in an employment case); Wysong Corp. v. APN, Inc., 889 F.3d 267, 
271– 72 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting inference of customer confusion about the 
quality of pet food based on the court’s assumptions about consumer knowledge 
of “puffery”); KAABOOWorks Servs., LLC v. Pilsl, No. 17-CV-02530-CMA-KLM, 
2018 WL 2984801, at *6 (D. Colo. June 14, 2018) (finding inference of use or 
disclosure of stolen trade secrets plausible); Zaidan v. Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 8, 
20 (D.D.C. 2018) (accepting inference that the government had placed the plaintiff 
on a “kill list” as plausible, despite other plausible inferences); Ortiz v. 
Parkchester N. Condo., No. 16-CV-9646 (VSB), 2018 WL 2976011, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 13, 2018) (rejecting inference that existence of multiple prior lawsuits 
showed that violations were widespread and persistent). 
 37.  See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decided Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 (2007) 
[hereinafter Blinking] (“The results of our CRT and judicial decision-making 
studies show that intuition influences judicial decision making.”). 
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differences can be observed on at least two levels: 1) which 
evidence in the record the judges notice and consider; and 2) which 
inferences the judges believe could reasonably be drawn from that 
evidence. In the pleading context, evaluation of inferences includes 
a comparative process; in order to keep the case alive, the 
nonmovant must convince the judge that the inference s/he needs 
is at least as believable as alternative inferences.38 
1. Pleadings Motions: Lewis v. Bentley39 
In ruling on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
court is instructed to analyze the complaint to identify only 
pleaded “facts,” and then to determine whether the inferences the 
lawsuit needs to proceed can plausibly be drawn from those facts. 
As Justice Kennedy stated: 
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 
complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”40 
The requirement to go beyond “mere possibility” involves a 
comparison of inferences.41 Later in the opinion, Justice Kennedy 
rejects the plaintiffs’ inferences because there are “more likely 
explanations.”42 In ruling on 12(b)(6) motions, then, the trial court 
will be deciding which inference it finds more believable (and, 
using a de novo standard of review, the court of appeals will be 
doing the same analysis).43 
 
 38.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). 
 39.  Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690, 2017 WL 432464, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 
Feb. 1, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lewis v. Governor of Alabama, 
896 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted, 914 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 40.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted). 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id. at 681. 
 43.  See Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *2 (determining the plausibility of 
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Lewis v. Bentley arose out of a dispute between the State of 
Alabama and the City of Birmingham over the city’s desire to adopt 
a minimum wage higher than the federally mandated $7.25 per 
hour.44 Birmingham passed a local ordinance with a higher 
minimum wage, but the State, just as Birmingham’s ordinance 
was set to go into effect, enacted the “Alabama Uniform Minimum 
Wage and Right-to-Work Act.”45 According to its terms, the Act was 
intended to “ensure that [labor] regulation and policy is applied 
uniformly throughout the state.”46 It went beyond minimum wage 
law to establish the state’s “complete control” over not only 
minimum wage policy, but also most other employment law 
issues.47 
A number of Birmingham residents and public interest groups 
filed suit, alleging that the Act had the purpose and effect of 
transferring control of employment in Birmingham from municipal 
officials elected by a majority-black local electorate to statewide 
legislators elected by a majority-white electorate, with the intent 
of discriminating on the basis of race against the people who live 
and work in Birmingham.48 The district court found that 
Birmingham’s complaint failed to plausibly allege intentional 
discrimination and dismissed the case on the pleadings.49 Focusing 
on the city’s equal protection claim, the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed.50 
Disagreements about inferences explain these divergent 
results. The trial judge—U.S. District Judge David 
Proctor51— focused on the supremacy of state government over 
 
plaintiff’s claims and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant); 
Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1289 (“[W]e review the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss de novo, ‘accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing 
them in light most favorable to the plaintiff.’”).  
 44.  Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *1. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at *2. 
 49.  Id. at *13. 
 50.  See Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(citation omitted) (“We believe [plaintiffs’] ‘allegations entitle them to make good 
on their claim.’”). 
 51.  See David Proctor, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/Z4CM-FQQC (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2018) (providing background on Judge Proctor) (on file with the 
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municipal government and noted that other states had adopted 
similar laws.52 To Judge Proctor, these race-neutral explanations 
were more believable than an inference of intentional 
discrimination.53 He found that there were “obvious alternative 
explanations” suggesting lawful conduct.54 
Contrast that with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion—written by 
Judge Charles Wilson55—which both highlighted different 
evidence and found different inferences to be plausible: 
• “Birmingham . . . [is] home to the largest black 
population in Alabama (72%), which is reflected in the 
racial composition of its city council.”56 
• The bill was introduced by a white state representative 
from a town where only 1.5% of the residents are black, 
with eventual support from fifty-two additional 
sponsors, all of whom were white.57 
• No black member of the Alabama legislature voted in 
favor of the bill.58 
• The State of Alabama has a “deep and troubled history 
of racial discrimination,” and “has consistently impeded 
the efforts of its black citizens to achieve social and 
economic equality.”59 
• In terms of predictable impact, the Act “immediately 
denied a significant wage increase to roughly 40,000 
 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52.  Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690, 2017 WL 432464, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 
Feb. 1, 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 
F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted, 914 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that 
plaintiffs’ allegation of intentional discrimination failed to “nudge” their claim 
across the plausibility threshold). 
 53.  See id. at *13 (“Without specific factual allegations of an intent to 
discriminate on the part of any particular legislators, plaintiffs’ equal protection 
claims fail.”). 
 54.  Id. at *11.  
 55.  See Charles Wilson (Florida), BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/3B96-DK24 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2018) (providing background on Judge Wilson) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 56.  Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1287–88. 
 57.  Id. at 1288. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 1295. 
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Birmingham residents, the vast majority of whom were 
black.”60 
Judge Wilson and the members of the Eleventh Circuit panel 
evaluated inferences quite differently from Judge Proctor, finding 
that these “facts plausibly imply discriminatory motivations were 
at play.”61 They therefore found dismissal on the pleadings to have 
been erroneous.62 
2. Summary Judgment: Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.63 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”64 Courts applying this 
test regularly recite that a dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could grant a verdict in favor of the 
nonmovant.65 While the judge should not be comparing 
inferences,66 some opinions cite the possibility of alternative 
inferences in rejecting the one sought by the nonmovant as 
unreasonable.67 Judicial preferences for differing inferences 
therefore can have a significant impact on their rulings on 
fact-based summary judgment motions.68 
 
 60. Id. 
 61.  Compare Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(finding plaintiffs’ “detailed factual allegations” support plausible discriminatory 
motivations), with Lewis, 2017 WL 432464, at *13 (determining plaintiffs did not 
support “conclusory, shotgun allegations” of discriminatory motivations).  
 62.  See Lewis, 896 F.3d at 1299 (deciding that plaintiffs have stated 
plausible claims).  
 63.  550 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D. Me. 2008), rev’d, 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 64.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 65.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation 
omitted) (stating that at summary judgment, the trial judge should not “weigh 
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter”). 
 66.  But see Ryan Lee Hart, Deterrence and Fairness: Why the Current 
Financial Crisis Demands a Product-Oriented Relaxation of the PSLRA, 5 SETON 
HALL CIR. REV. 411, 430 (2009) (noting that judges often compare inferences when 
determining if the scienter requirement is fulfilled in securities class actions).  
 67.  See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 145–46 (rejecting the nonmoving 
party’s inference and accepting the inference drawn by the moving defendant). 
 68.  Although they do not always explicitly refer to “inferences,” summary 
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Laurie Chadwick, a longtime employee of WellPoint, was 
denied a promotion.69 She alleged that WellPoint “failed to promote 
her because of a sex-based stereotype that women who are 
mothers, particularly of young children, neglect their jobs in favor 
of their presumed childcare responsibilities,” and filed suit against 
 
judgment cases turning on the likely sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence in 
the summary judgment record also turn on judges’ assessment of whether 
inferences would be reasonable. One of the best known examples of differing 
inferences in the summary judgment context is Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 
(2007), in which the district judge, court of appeals judges, and Justice Stevens 
disagreed with the Supreme Court majority about the inferences to be drawn from 
a videotape and other parts of the summary judgment record. Compare Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (majority opinion) (“Respondent’s version of 
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have 
believed him.”), with 550 U.S. 372, 390 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“More 
importantly, [the videotape] surely does not provide a principled basis for 
depriving the respondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question . . . .”), 
and Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815 (11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting “the 
defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be considered 
sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a 
substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists”), and Harris v. 
Coweta Cty., No. 3:01CV148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003) 
(finding that “a fact issue remains regarding whether Scott violated the Fourth 
Amendment by using excessive force to seize Harris”). See, e.g., Bell v. Prefix, Inc., 
321 F. App’x 423, 426–27 (6th Cir. 2009) (analyzing inferences that could be 
drawn from plaintiff’s evidence of pretext in FMLA case); Corbitt v. Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc., 589 F.3d 1136, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (disagreeing regarding 
inferences to be drawn in sexual harassment and retaliation case), vacated, 598 
F.3d 1259 (2010); Peck v. Elyria Foundry Co., 347 F. App’x 139, 142–43 (6th Cir. 
2009) (drawing contrasting inferences in Title VII case with majority and dissent 
emphasizing different evidence from the summary judgment record). The reversal 
rate of orders granting summary judgment is another indicator that judges 
disagree with each other significantly about what inferences are reasonable. See 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial Humility, 
Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 650–53 
(2012) (emphasizing that trial court decisions on summary judgment are affirmed 
only slightly more than half of the time). For further examples of trial and 
appellate court judges disagreeing about inferences in the summary judgment 
context, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender 
and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 739–45 (2007) (noting the 
different inferences that can be drawn from evidence about the work 
environment). 
 69.  Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 40–41. 
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the company.70 At the trial court level, the magistrate judge and 
district judge granted WellPoint’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that Chadwick’s circumstantial evidence could not 
support a reasonable inference of discrimination based on sex.71 
The First Circuit panel (using a de novo standard of review) 
reversed, finding that a reasonable jury could draw just such an 
inference.72 
At the time WellPoint chose to promote a different employee 
(also a woman) to the desired “Team Lead” position, Chadwick was 
the mother of four: an eleven-year-old child plus six-year-old 
triplets.73 Her husband was the children’s primary caregiver, and 
there was no suggestion in the record that her work performance 
had ever suffered due to childcare responsibilities.74 Chadwick had 
worked in her current position at WellPoint for seven years, and 
she scored 4.4 out of 5.0 on her most recent performance review.75 
The other finalist for the Team Leader job, Donna Ouelette, 
also had children, ages ten and fifteen.76 (It is unclear, though, 
whether the decisionmaker was aware that Ouelette was a 
parent.77) She had been in her position for a year, and she scored 
3.84 on her performance review.78 After interviews with a panel of 
three employees, including Chadwick’s supervisor Nanci Miller, 
Ouelette was chosen for the promotion.79 
 
 70.  Id. at 41. 
 71.  See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (opining that there was nothing 
contained in the summary judgment record beyond an “assumption” that Miller 
discriminated against working mothers of young children). 
 72.  See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We only 
conclude that Chadwick has presented sufficient evidence of sex-based 
stereotyping to have her day in court.”). 
 73.  Id. at 42. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 41–42. 
 76.  Id. at 42. 
 77.  Id. at 42 n.4 (“[T]he record does not support the inference that WellPoint 
knew of Ouelette’s status as a mother of two children, while it is uncontested that 
WellPoint knew of Chadwick's children.”). But see Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 
550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 141 n.1 (D. Me. 2008) (putting the burden on the plaintiff to 
show a lack of awareness of Ouelette’s children and, in the absence of evidence, 
assuming awareness).  
 78.  Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 41–42. 
 79.  Id.  
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Because the summary judgment context requires the judge to 
view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, 
both the trial and appellate courts assumed that Chadwick had 
stronger qualifications than Ouelette.80 They also recognized that 
society is influenced by stereotypes about working women with 
children.81 However, they disagreed decisively about the 
inferential power of Chadwick’s circumstantial evidence, which 
consisted primarily of the information narrated above plus 
comments made to Chadwick in the course of the decision about 
promotion.82  
First, when Miller learned that Chadwick had three 
six-year-olds, she said, “Oh my—I did not know you had 
triplets . . . [sic] Bless you!”83 U.S. District Judge D. Brock 
Hornby84 considered inferences in favor of the movant—perhaps 
any bias reflected by this remark was a gender-neutral concern 
about parents rather than mothers.85 He looked for evidence that 
Miller would not have said the same thing to the father of triplets, 
found it lacking, and therefore rejected an inference that gender 
played a role in Miller’s decision.86 Based on his experience and his 
beliefs about how the world works, Judge Hornby inferred that 
“[b]less you” was a phrase with “ordinary meaning”—a mere 
 
 80.  Note, though, that the district judge conceded only that Chadwick had 
“somewhat better qualifications,” Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 142, while the 
appellate panel stated, “[i]t is a fair inference that Chadwick’s qualifications 
significantly outweighed those of Ouelette.” Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 n.3. 
 81.  See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 45 (“[S]ex-based stereotypes regarding 
women, families, and work are alive and well in our society.”); Chadwick, 550 F. 
Supp. 2d at 146 (“[C]ultural stereotypes certainly exist in our society about a 
mother’s role.”). 
 82.  See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46 n.9 (finding a jury “could infer” Chadwick 
was rejected because “as a woman with four young children, [she] would not give 
her all to her job”); Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (opining that Chadwick has 
only “assumption or conjecture that Miller was stereotyping her”).  
 83.  Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
 84.  See D. Brock Hornby, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/7UTG-EWDA (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2019) (providing background on Judge Hornby) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85.  See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 146 (suggesting Miller’s comments 
could have been made out of admiration for parents raising triplets).  
 86.  See id. at 147 (“Nothing in the record suggests a general atmosphere of 
sex-based stereotyping.”).  
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“friendly exclamation” with uses ranging from a response to a 
sneeze to a religious invocation.87  
In contrast, Judge Normal Stahl,88 writing for the First Circuit 
panel, noted that “a jury could reasonably conclude that Miller 
meant that she felt badly for Chadwick because her life must have 
been so difficult as the mother of three young children” and “that 
Miller’s comment suggested pity rather than respect.”89 This, 
together with additional remarks, convinced the appellate panel 
that a jury could reasonably infer that the promotion was denied 
based on an assumption that as a woman with four small children, 
Chadwick would not “give her all to her job.”90 The appellate court 
also found it significant that Miller learned of the children just two 
months before denying Chadwick the promotion.91 
Second, during Chadwick’s interview for the promotion, one of 
the interviewers made an explicit reference to Chadwick’s 
parenthood.92 In reacting to Chadwick’s answer to a question about 
supervising employees who failed to meet deadlines, the 
interviewer said, “Laurie, you are a mother [sic] would you let your 
kids off the hook that easy, if they made a mess in [their] room, 
would you clean it or hold them accountable?”93 District Judge 
Hornby again saw no sex stereotyping, because the same question 
could have been asked of a father.94 Doing so implicitly chose an 
inference that the interviewer was thinking of parents generally 
 
 87.  Id. at 145. 
 88.  See Norman Stahl, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/TFC5-RWJK (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2019) (providing background on Judge Stahl) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Judge Stahl was appointed to the First Circuit 
to replace Justice David Souter when the latter was appointed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Id. 
 89.  Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 47 n.10 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See id. at 47 (“The young age and unusually high number of children 
would have been more likely to draw the decisionmaker’s attention and 
strengthen any sex-based concern she had that a woman with young children 
would be a poor worker.”). 
 92.  Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 (D. Me. 2008). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See id. at 145 (“It may not have been good business judgment for the 
interviewer to relate home circumstances to the workplace, but it is not sex-based: 
the principle and the question apply equally to discipline by a father.”). 
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rather than thinking of women with children.95 Judge Stahl noted 
but did not explicitly draw inferences from this question.96 
Chadwick’s most significant circumstantial evidence consisted 
of statements she alleged were made by Miller in explaining why 
Chadwick was not chosen for the promotion.97 In the same 
conversation, Miller told Chadwick that “if [the three interviewers] 
were in your position, they would feel overwhelmed.”98 WellPoint 
took the position that the real reason Chadwick was denied the 
promotion was that she interviewed badly, and that Miller was just 
trying to offer a less hurtful reason for rejection.99 Judge Hornby 
recognized that the remark reflected discrimination against 
caregivers, but again would not recognize as reasonable an 
inference that it was based on sex: 
If the case went to a jury on this record, the jury would have to 
speculate in order to reach a conclusion that Miller stereotyped 
working mothers and that she treated working mothers of 
young children worse than (given the opportunity) she would 
treat working fathers of young children. . . . Might Miller 
harbor such stereotypes? Yes; the jury might well suspect it. But 
suspicion is not enough; despite what might be the popular 
 
 95. Id. 
 96.  See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 42 (noting only that the district court 
concluded the comment can apply to a mother or a father).  
 97.  See id. at 47 (“It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just that you’re 
going to school, you have kids and you just have a lot on your plate right now.”).  
 98.  Id. at 42. 
 99.  Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 143. Miller so testified at her deposition, 
but in the summary judgment context both courts recognized that a jury, whose 
job it is to assess credibility, could choose to disbelieve her testimony. See 
Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 47 (“A jury could reasonably question the veracity of this 
[Miller’s] second explanation . . . .”); Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 145 n.10 (“[A] 
jury could disbelieve [Miller’s] explanation and find it pretextual.”). As the court 
of appeals noted, Miller explained the non-promotion in one way to Chadwick 
(that she had too much on her plate with her kids and school) and in a very 
different way in her deposition (that Chadwick had performed poorly in her 
interviews). A jury could reasonably question the veracity of this second 
explanation given that Chadwick was an in-house, long-time employee who had 
worked closely with her interviewers, had received stellar performance reviews, 
and was already performing some of the key tasks of the Team Lead position. A 
jury could rightly question whether brief interviews would actually trump 
Chadwick’s apparently weighty qualifications, or whether, given the other 
circumstantial evidence discussed above, Chadwick was really passed over 
because of sex-based stereotypes. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 47–48. 
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intuition about what Miller meant, I conclude that her use of 
sexual stereotypes cannot be shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence on this record.100 
For this judge, the missing link was something more specific 
proving that a man with four young children would not have been 
treated the same way, and he characterized Chadwick’s evidence 
as merely prevalent stereotypes plus a “sexually ambiguous 
utterance.”101 The plaintiff’s superior qualifications, the series of 
remarks, and the background of societal stereotyping were not 
enough to make an inference sufficiently believable compared to 
other possibilities.102 
Compare that to Judge Stahl’s opinion for the First Circuit, 
looking at the same record and applying the same standard of 
proof.103 It paid far more attention to the statement “it was nothing 
you did or didn’t do,” the reference to “kids,” and the suggestion 
that the interviewers imagined Chadwick would be 
“overwhelmed.”104 Putting this conversation together with the 
other circumstantial evidence (as read through the appellate 
court’s inferences), this opinion required no explicit comparison to 
males to infer that gender stereotypes, not just parenting 
stereotypes, were at work: 
Given the common stereotype about the job performance of 
women with children and given the surrounding circumstantial 
evidence presented by Chadwick, we believe that a reasonable 
jury could find that WellPoint would not have denied a 
promotion to a similarly qualified man because he had “too 
much on his plate” and would be “overwhelmed” by the new job, 
given “the kids” and his schooling.105 
 
 100.  Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (emphasis added). 
 101.  Id. at 147 n.15.  
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).   
 104.  Id. at 47. 
 105.  Id. at 48. The opinion also noted the “parallel stereotypes presuming a 
lack of domestic responsibilities for men.” Id. The First Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to exclude a proposed plaintiff-side expert witness on sex 
stereotyping, but it did so on the narrower ground of the expert’s lack of 
knowledge about the facts of this particular case, a deficiency that presumably 
could have been remedied on remand. See id. at 49 n.14 (“Rather, we understand 
the district court to have concluded that Dr. Still could not offer information 
helpful to a trier of fact due to her particular lack of familiarity with the details 
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Once again, then, the courts’ opinions show an inference gap, 
and one that cannot be explained by the record itself.106 Two judges 
(the district judge and magistrate judge) found an inference of 
sex-based discrimination so unlikely that summary judgment was 
granted.107 Three judges (the First Circuit panel), reviewing the 
case de novo, found that such an inference would be proper, so that 
the case should go to the jury.108 
B. Other Pretrial Rulings 
Inferences that are contested but that end litigation are 
especially troubling. But the same phenomenon of judges’ reliance 
on arguable inferences also impacts non-dispositive pretrial 
rulings. Many such decisions provide wide discretion for the trial 
judge, and they are governed by general standards or multi factor 
tests rather than strict rules.109 The decisions, though, will be 
based on facts as the judge finds them, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, consciously or subconsciously. Those forces create a 
context in which the judge’s beliefs about “facts” can play a 
powerful role when the governing standards are applied to them.110 
 
of this case.”).  
 106.  Id. at 47.  
 107.  See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D. Me. 2008) 
(“I agree with the recommendation (although not all the reasoning) of the 
magistrate judge, and GRANT the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”).  
 108.  See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 48 (“In sum, we find that Chadwick has put 
forth sufficient evidence of discrimination that a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the promotion denial was more probably than not caused by 
discrimination.”). On remand, the parties apparently settled the case in a way 
that included a judgment for defendant on stipulated facts that resembled 
defendants’ factual claims and that stipulates to a disagreement about what 
Miller said to Chadwick. See Joint Motion as to Stipulated Facts and for Entry of 
Final Judgment for Defendants at 5, Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 
2d 140 (D. Me. 2008) (No. 07-CV-70) (“The parties agree that Defendants’ decision 
to award the position to Ouelette was not based upon gender or any sex based 
stereotype.”). Chadwick still worked for WellPoint at the time of the stipulation. 
Id. at 1. 
 109.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
No. CV 17-9501, 2018 WL 3374164, at *2 (E.D. La. July 11, 2018) (proportionality 
factors for adjudicating protective orders).  
 110.  See Chadwick, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (believing that statements made 
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 In making these rulings the judge is finding the facts and not 
merely deciding whether there is a genuine factual dispute for 
later jury determination. Except in very limited circumstances, the 
standard of proof for these pretrial rulings is the conventional 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard: more likely than not.111 
The judge is undertaking a comparative task in evaluating 
information and reaching conclusions. And once again, it is the 
mental exercise of finding some inference more believable that is 
the source of differing outcomes. This section will highlight three 
 
to plaintiff were not gender-based stereotypes, thus she could not maintain action 
under Title VII). 
 111.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 974 
(2006) (noting the usual standard, and discussing the problems associated with 
establishing jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence when they 
relate to the underlying merits of the case).  
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examples: two are disputes about discovery,112 and one relates to 
class certification.113 
 
 112.  Discovery relevance orders quite often turn on decisions about whether 
the information sought would support an inference in favor of the party seeking 
discovery. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency 
to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . .”). 
Balancing factors related to proportionality and requests for protective orders will 
also turn on the court’s belief about underlying facts to be inferred. For example, 
how important are the issues at stake; what amount is really in controversy; how 
important is the requested discovery to resolution of the issues; what will the 
benefit of the information be? See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (detailing proportionality 
factors). Privilege decisions may turn on facts such as whether a document was 
created in anticipation of litigation, whether a lawyer was acting in her capacity 
as an attorney, or whether a communication was kept confidential, and many of 
those decisions will be inferences from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., 
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 303, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(determining purpose of the attorney-client communication). Even managerial 
decisions may turn on the judge’s beliefs about the strength of the inferential link 
between discovery and legal claims, the motivations of parties and attorneys, and 
the cost of discovery. For some recent examples of discovery decisions based on 
inferences, see Wittmann v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV 17-9501, 2018 WL 
3374164, at *2 (E.D. La. July 11, 2018) (inference from income sources to 
allegations of conflict of interest); Shah v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 2:16-CV-1124, 
2018 WL 2309595, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2018) (inference from employee 
rewards and bonuses to their handling of plaintiff’s disability claim); English v. 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 323 F.R.D. 1, at *7 (D.D.C. 2017) (inferences 
from bus driver’s pre-accident activities to negligence in driving and dragging 
plaintiff under bus); Does I-XIX v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 1:13-CV-00275, 2017 
WL 3841902, at *3 (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017) (inference between content of Boy 
Scout files and claims of misrepresentation and abuse); Bias v. Tangipahoa Par. 
Sch. Bd., No. CV 12-2202, 2017 WL 679365, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2017) 
(inference between plaintiff’s military records, transfer, and claim of retaliation 
for filing False Claims Act suit); Centeno v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-CV-00653, 
2016 WL 7491634, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (inference between prior 
complaints about defendant officers and actions in current excessive force claim).  
 113.  The requirements for class certification turn on fact findings, many of 
which in turn are based on inferences. See, e.g., Menocal v. GEO Grp., 882 F.3d 
905, 918 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding the predominance requirement for a 23(b)(3) 
class action met when plaintiffs will be able to prove causation through class-wide 
inference); Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 879 F.3d 474, 483 (2d 
Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “fraud on the market” theory is a presumption that 
an inference can be drawn); Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1702 (2018) (discussing factors from which inference 
of efficient market may be drawn); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 
512–13 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that materiality of misrepresentations could 
support an inference of reliance for entire class). 
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1. Relevance and Protective Orders: Cazorla v. Koch Foods of 
Mississippi, LLC114 
Hispanic employees of Koch Foods, a poultry processor, 
alleged that they were subjected to harassment and abuse on the 
job.115 Koch, on the other hand, claimed that the employees had 
made up the allegations in order to get U visas, which are available 
to abuse victims who assist in government investigations.116 
Those opposing positions led to a discovery dispute: the 
company sought discovery of any information related to the 
employees’ U visa applications.117 The plaintiffs objected, arguing 
that the discovery would reveal to Koch the immigration status of 
any applicants and their families, creating risks of job loss and 
deportation.118 The magistrate judge and district judge allowed U 
visa-related discovery but entered a protective order prohibiting 
certain uses of the information.119 The Fifth Circuit vacated the 
trial court’s order.120 
Koch Foods operates a large poultry plant in Morton, 
Mississippi, and the dispute underlying this lawsuit arose out of 
allegations about harassment in the room where approximately 
eighty-five employees debone and package chicken thighs.121 The 
workers in this room were almost all Hispanic, most were illiterate 
and spoke little English, and many were undocumented.122 Here 
are the workers’ allegations, as summarized by the Fifth Circuit: 
Koch supervisors allegedly groped female workers, and in some 
cases assaulted them more violently; offered female workers 
money or promotions for sex; made sexist and racist comments; 
 
 114.  No. 3:10cv135, 2014 WL 12639863 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014), vacated, 
838 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 115.  Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 544. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *5–6. For reasons relating to statutory 
interpretation, the discovery order was certified for interlocutory review. Cazorla, 
838 F.3d at 548 n.16. 
 120.  See Cazorla, 838 F.3d at 564 (“Rather than impose an order of our own, 
we remand to the district court to devise an approach to U visa discovery that 
adequately protects the diverse and competing interests at stake.”). 
 121.  Id. at 544. 
 122.  Id. 
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punched, elbowed, and otherwise physically abused workers of 
both sexes; and demanded money from them in exchange for 
permission for bathroom breaks, sick leave, and transfers to 
other positions . . . . When workers complained or resisted, Koch 
managers allegedly ignored them, and some debone supervisors 
allegedly retaliated by docking their pay; demoting, 
reassigning, or firing them; and threatening to physically harm 
them or have them arrested or deported.123 
Ten workers filed the first claims with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2009, and they and a few 
more followed up with lawsuits in 2010 and 2011.124 Meanwhile in 
2010, the EEOC launched its own investigation, found reasonable 
cause to believe a violation had occurred, and filed its own suit 
identifying a class of about fifty to seventy-five individuals.125 The 
cases were consolidated, and several additional employees 
intervened in the EEOC’s suit.126 
Koch denied the allegations, arguing that all of the 
complainants made up their charges to qualify for improved 
immigration status under the federal U visa program.127 That 
denial defense led to the discovery requests at issue here.128 The 
claimants requested a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c), arguing that the information sought was not 
relevant, and that even if it was relevant, the benefit of the 
information to Koch was outweighed by the harm that compliance 
would cause to the claimants and others.129 
 
 123.  Id. at 544–45. 
 124.  Id. at 545. Those first lawsuits were stayed while the EEOC charges were 
being resolved. Id. 
 125.  Id. at 545–46. 
 126.  Id. at 546. 
 127.  Id. at 545. The U visa program offers four years of nonimmigrant status 
to qualifying individuals and their family members and allows them to apply for 
green cards. Id. (citation omitted). Those with pending U visa applications may 
also attain work authorization. Id. The program is available to victims of 
substantial physical or mental abuse who aid a law enforcement agency in 
investigating the alleged offenses. Id. That agency must certify that the applicant 
is aiding the investigation, and the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service 
(USCIS) must conduct its own de novo review of relevant evidence and confirm 
the victim’s eligibility. Id.  
 128.  Id. at 547.   
 129.  Id. at 546.  
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The magistrate judge, district judge,130 and Fifth Circuit panel 
all addressed the same balancing test in evaluating the 
defendant’s discovery request and plaintiffs’ request for a 
protective order: did the potential relevance of the U visa 
information outweigh the in terrorem effect of revealing that 
immigration-relevant information to Koch? In making that 
decision, the trial level judges and Fifth Circuit judges differed in 
their factual beliefs about both relevance and the fears held by 
immigrant populations.131 
Implementation of the Rule 26(c) balancing test required 
subsidiary fact finding in order to determine the extent of 
relevance and harm.132 At the trial level, with respect to relevance, 
the magistrate judge and district judge found the complainants’ 
credibility to be a central issue and the immigration information 
highly relevant to assessing it.133 Those judges concurred with 
Koch’s argued inference that the existence of an “exponential 
jump” or “spike” in claims after the EEOC became involved,134 
coupled with applications for U visas, was relevant to the issue of 
 
 130.  See Daniel P. Jordan III, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/EBP6-ZMET 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (providing background on Judge Jordan) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
    131.  In considering many discovery disputes, the court is using the 
information at hand to predict what will happen in the future rather than 
assessing the comparative probability of past events. Id. Nevertheless, the factors 
that underlie discovery orders are very fact-based. Id. At the trial level, “[t]he 
court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to 
consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination 
of the appropriate scope of discovery.” FED R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s 
note to 2015 amendment. 
 132.  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(c) (requiring a proportionality calculation that 
weighs the potential benefit against the harms). 
 133. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:10cv135, 2014 WL 
12639863, at *5–6 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2014) (using the “clearly erroneous” or 
“contrary to law” standard of review to defer to the magistrate judge even at the 
trial level (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a))). With minor exceptions, the district 
judge approved of the magistrate judge’s order. Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Miss., 
LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 564 (5th Cir. 2016) 
    134.  See Cazorla, 2014 WL 12639863, at *5 (stating only eight people initially 
filed claims with the EEOC, while in its Third Amended Complaint the EEOC 
identified 115 claimants, 44 of whom were women who claimed to have been 
sexually harassed and the rest of whom claimed some other kind of harassment 
or injury). 
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the claimants’ credibility and thus to the truth of the underlying 
claims.135 
With respect to prejudice if discovery were allowed, the trial 
judges refused to infer from the claimants’ immigration and 
employment situation that being forced to reveal the U visa 
applications to Koch would have an in terrorem effect on the 
claimants themselves or on others who might find themselves in a 
similar situation.136 First, the trial judges found none of the named 
plaintiffs work for Koch anymore, so they would not fear being 
fired.137 Further, inferred the trial judges, claimants who had 
applied for U visas had already revealed to federal immigration 
authorities that they were not properly in the United States, so 
even if Koch reported them to immigration officials there could be 
no additional harm.138 At the trial level then, the judges 
discounted the claimants’ statements of their own subjective fears 
and did not infer future harm from disclosure to Koch.139 
The Fifth Circuit judges, in an opinion written by Judge 
Patrick Higginbotham,140 might well not have vacated the order 
based only on private interests, given the very deferential “abuse 
of discretion” standard of review.141 They did agree that the 
 
 135. See id. (agreeing with Koch Foods that “given the spike in 
claims . . . coupled with the information provided in camera, there is a sufficient 
basis to find relevance”).  
 136. See id. (determining that the plaintiff’s in terrorem argument is based on 
a far broader interpretation of the Magistrate Judge’s order than its narrow 
application and carries less weight than the probative value of the discovery). 
 137. See id. at *6 n.8 (“Even as to the other aggrieved individuals, it appears 
that a small number remain employed, and some of them may have other 
protection. Those that do not could be addressed in a protective order.”). 
 138. Id. 
    139.  See id. (judging claimants’ arguments as holding very little weight with 
regard to the in terrorem effects of the discovery at issue). 
    140.  See Patrick Higginbotham, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/X2JA-M4RX 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2019) (providing general information on Judge 
Higginbotham) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
    141.  See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 547 (5th 
Cir. 2016). As the Fifth Circuit opinion notes, the trial court will be found to have 
abused its discretion in balancing only “when a relevant factor that should have 
been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper 
factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and 
no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, 
commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 
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information sought was relevant for purposes of impeachment.142 
But their inferences were different. For example, the Fifth Circuit 
found that the “spike in claims” number, on its own, was “not 
particularly suggestive of mass fraud.”143 Instead, for example, 
“the EEOC may have discovered additional harassment claimants 
during the pre-suit conciliation and investigation processes.”144 
The appellate judges relied on information about statutory 
provisions that deter false U visa claims,145 and also cited evidence 
suggesting a pattern of abuse of immigrant workers in the poultry 
industry.146  
Other differences relate to the “prejudice” side of the balancing 
test. The appellate judges inferred that disclosure of the U visa 
information would cause significant harm, both to the individual 
claimants and to their family members.147 With respect to 
employment, the Fifth Circuit judges believed that the evidence 
showed “a risk that U visa discovery will cause some claimants or 
family members to lose their jobs.”148 Nor did the appellate judges 
conclude that disclosure to U visa processors removed fear of all 
immigration consequences.149 Instead, it found that: 
 
F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)). A finding of abuse of discretion could thus be based 
on the evidence considered rather than the inference itself. Id. at 547. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the Fifth Circuit opinion in this case reveals 
that its inferences differ from those of the trial court. See generally id. 
 142.  Id. at 558. 
    143.  See id. (stating that any number of explanations could explain the 
increase in claims beside fraud alone). 
 144. Id. 
 145.  See id. (“We further note that the U visa process contains numerous 
protections against fraud, which should deter claimants from lying in their U visa 
applications and the EEOC from abetting applications that it knows or suspects 
to be fraudulent.”). See also id. at 558 n.57 (“It is USCIS that has the power to 
grant each application, and it does so only after a de novo review of all the relevant 
evidence. . . . USCIS can revoke U visas and initiate deportation proceedings if 
application fraud is uncovered.”) (citations omitted). 
 146.  See id. at 558 n.59 (citing numerous sources to demonstrate workplace 
abuse in the poultry industry). 
 147.  Id. at 559–62. 
 148.  Id. at 560. 
 149.  See id. at 561 (“[T]he claimants might fear that Koch will violate the 
order and turn them in anyway. And employers commonly and unlawfully 
retaliate against irksome workers by reporting or threatening to report them to 
immigration authorities. A protective order would not necessarily quell claimants’ 
fear . . . .”). 
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An abuse victim might well be willing to disclose sensitive 
information to a few sympathetic officials, yet nonetheless fear 
that his or her abuser might obtain that information and spread 
it far and wide. . . . [T]heir having submitted U visa applications 
does not rule out an in terrorem effect from further 
disclosure.150 
The factual disagreement about the impact of disclosure once 
again comes from a difference in which facts the different judges 
chose to consider as well as the inferences to be drawn from them. 
In addition to discovery’s potential impact on the complainants, 
Judge Higginbotham’s opinion considered the harm that disclosure 
would cause to the enforcement efforts of the EEOC, amicus 
National Labor Relations Board, and law enforcement agencies 
nationwide, finding that disclosure would deter immigrant victims 
of abuse, thereby frustrating Congress’s purpose in creating the U 
visa program.151 
Putting all of those factual conclusions together (lesser 
relevance, stronger individual harm, and very strong societal harm 
that had not been considered by the trial court), the Fifth Circuit 
vacated the trial level discovery order and remanded for further 
proceedings.152 
 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. at 562–63 
Allowing U visa discovery from the claimants themselves in this 
high-profile case will undermine the spirit, if not the letter, of those 
Congressionally sanctioned assurances and may sow confusion over 
when and how U visa information may be disclosed, deterring 
immigrant victims of abuse—many of whom already mistrust the 
government—from stepping forward and thereby frustrating 
Congress’s intent in enacting the U visa program. 
 152.  In 2018, the EEOC and Koch Foods entered into a $3.75 million consent 
decree that also included actions to prevent future violations. See Mica Rosenberg 
& Kristina Cooke, Allegations of Labor Abuses Dogged Mississippi Plant Years 
Before Immigration Raids, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2019, 10:40 AM), 
https://perma.cc/SCV2-98ZL (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). In August of 2019, this Koch Foods plant was 
one of the targets of a massive immigration sweep by U.S. Customs and 
Immigration Enforcement. Id. 
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2. Relevance and Burden: Kuttner v. Zaruba153 
This discovery dispute arose out of an employment 
discrimination case.154 The difference in inferences here are found 
in disagreements on appeal between the majority opinion of Judges 
Sykes and Easterbrook, and the dissent written by Judge 
Posner.155 
Plaintiff Susan Kuttner worked for the DuPage County 
Sheriff’s office beginning in 1998.156 In 2010, she was fired based 
on a claim that she had worn (at least part of) her uniform while 
trying to collect a loan for her boyfriend.157 She visited the debtor’s 
home, spoke to his father (the debtor himself was not at home), and 
left her business card.158 Kuttner admitted to violating two rules: 
“conduct unbecoming” an officer and improper wearing of her 
uniform, and as a result Sheriff Zaruba fired her.159 Kuttner filed 
a sex discrimination suit, alleging that male deputies had received 
less severe punishment for more severe violations on a number of 
occasions.160 
Kuttner sought to discover the personnel files of thirty named 
deputies who she believed had violated department policies.161 The 
trial judge limited that discovery to incidents after January 1, 2006 
and to charges involving abuse of authority.162 Toward the end of 
the discovery period, the judge also refused to allow Kuttner’s 
lawyer to ask questions during deposition about what deponents 
 
 153.  819 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2016). 
    154.  See id. at 971–72 (describing the facts at the lower court and the gender 
discrimination allegation). 
 155.  Compare id. at 973 (finding that without temporal restriction, discovery 
of incidents before 2008 would lead to an unjustified fishing expedition by the 
majority), with id. at 977 (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the twenty-one 
purported incidents alleged by Kuttner were relevant discovery necessary to 
determining the case on its merits). 
 156.  Id. at 972 (majority opinion). 
 157.  Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 973. 
 162. See id. (“Following a hearing, the judge concluded that Kuttner’s 
discovery requests were overly broad and unduly burdensome because they 
lacked any time limitation and were based on ‘an overbroad definition of 
‘similarity’ of misconduct.’”). 
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had heard about violations, limiting the inquiry to the deponent’s 
personal knowledge of infractions.163 Operating under those 
limitations, Kuttner was unable to convince the trial judge that 
un-fired male deputies’ conduct was comparable, and Sheriff 
Zaruba was granted summary judgment.164 
On appeal, a split Seventh Circuit panel affirmed.165 Judge 
Sykes,166 writing for the majority, held that the district judge had 
not abused his discretion in denying discovery.167 The majority 
found that the passage of time made inferences that comparable 
male deputies had not been as severely disciplined too attenuated 
to be relevant.168 The decision not to include the first seven years 
of Kuttner’s employment “served to hone in on possible 
comparators who were reasonably likely to have been subject to 
the same rules, supervisors, and decision making process as 
Kuttner.”169 Having affirmed the denial of discovery, the majority 
also affirmed the grant of summary judgment.170 Finding only 
infractions involving “improper projection of coercive police 
authority in service of a personal end” to be sufficiently similar to 
justify an inference of discrimination, the majority rejected the 
four post-2006 examples Kuttner brought to light (the discovery 
order had made evidence of other infractions unavailable).171 
 
    163.  Id. Kuttner’s lawyer asked Deputy Tara Campbell “whether she had ever 
heard or seen any deputy violate any Sheriff’s Office policy or procedure.” Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 977. 
 166. See Diane Sykes, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/4X5A-2JG7 (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Sykes) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Judge Sykes was on President Donald 
Trump’s list of twenty-five potential Supreme Court nominees to replace Justice 
Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. Id.  
    167.  See Kuttner v. Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2016) (“This standard 
requires us to affirm unless the judge’s ruling lacks a basis in law or fact or clearly 
appears to be arbitrary.”). 
 168.  See id. at 973−74 (giving less weight to plaintiff’s offer of comparators). 
    169.  Id. at 974. But see id. at 979 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he sheriff’s 
lawyer acknowledged that nothing had changed in 2006, and so there was no 
reason to ignore the earlier misconduct, which was the critical evidence of 
discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff.”). 
 170.  Id. at 977 (majority opinion). 
 171.  See id. at 976–77 
That’s what differentiates Kuttner’s misconduct from . . . Deputy 
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Judge Posner,172 on the other hand, would have found the 
denied discovery about other employees to be not merely relevant 
but also so significant that the trial court’s action required 
reversal.173 Kuttner listed twenty-one examples in her complaint, 
and Judge Posner highlighted ten of them, including sexual 
misdeeds, abuse of power, and domestic violence, some committed 
while in uniform.174 
In Judge Posner’s view, all of these officers’ misconduct (none 
of which resulted in firing) were at least as serious as the plaintiff’s 
actions and, because of inferences of discrimination that could 
result from the comparison, relevant for purposes of discovery.175 
He wrote, “[i]t is a virtual certainty that the plaintiff was 
disciplined far more harshly than male counterparts who engaged 
in far more egregious conduct—far more harshly because she’s a 
woman. The DuPage County Sheriff’s Office is or at least was a 
boy’s club.”176 
Note, then, the difference in decisions about what the 
information sought might be able to show. Judge Sykes’s majority 
opinion wanted to see specific parallels in time and circumstances 
before the trial court could draw an inference of 
discrimination-based disparate treatment.177 Under this view of 
the potential probative value (relevance) of other incidents, the 
 
Morgan’s allowing his girlfriend to wear his uniform to a Halloween 
party or making two personal visits to a female inmate in the jail. In 
Deputy Morgan’s case, there were no allegations of coercion by the use 
or appearance of legal authority. 
 172.  See Richard Posner, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/25FP-5QD3 (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Posner) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
    173.  See Kuttner, 819 F.3d at 980 (Posner, J., dissenting) (describing the 
majority as stymying a “promising” case of sex discrimination through an 
“arbitrary cut-off date” and the hearsay bar). 
    174.  See id. at 978–79 (listing numerous salacious and disturbing details from 
allegations known to Kuttner). Judge Posner further pointed to evidence that no 
changes had been made to department policy to render the list of accusations 
moot. Id. 
    175.  See id. at 979–80 (arguing that the severity of the allegations 
necessitated thorough discovery and that the allegations ultimately would have 
led to a successful claim for Kuttner). 
 176.  Id. at 980. 
    177.  See id. at 974 (majority opinion) (“[R]estricting the time period . . . served 
to hone in on possible comparators who were reasonably likely to have been 
subject to the same rules, supervisors, and decision-making process as Kuttner.”). 
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denial of discovery was supported by the facts.178 Judge Posner, on 
the other hand, thought the trial court should have found the 
information relevant because a wider array of disciplinary 
decisions could form the basis for an inference of discrimination.179 
3. Class Certification: Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc.180 
This putative class action against Steak ‘n Shake alleged that 
the company violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act181 (ADA) because their parking lots were not fully accessible to 
and independently usable by individuals who use wheelchairs or 
were otherwise mobility disabled.182 This time, the trial court 
reached a plaintiff-friendly result, and the court of appeals 
reversed.183 In the trial court, Magistrate Judge Robert C. 
Mitchell184 certified a broadly defined class.185  
 
    178.  See id. at 976 (“The district judge concluded that Kuttner failed to satisfy 
the prima facie requirements because she did not identify any similarly situated 
male employee who received more favorable treatment.”). 
 179.  See id. at 980 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The combination of the arbitrary 
cut-off date and the discovery hearsay bar was fatal to a promising case of 
disparate treatment based on gender. And ‘promising’ is an understatement.”). 
 180. No. 15-180, 2017 WL 1519544 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017), rev’d, 897 F.3d 
467 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 181.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2018). 
 182. See Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *1 (stating that two disability rights 
advocates, both disabled themselves, sued on behalf of all disabled persons who 
had had difficulty with Steak ‘n Shake parking lots). 
 183. Compare id. at *9 (finding that plaintiffs sufficiently met their burden 
for certifying a class), with Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 
491 (3d Cir. 2018) (reversing the trial court by finding that plaintiffs’ class did not 
meet the standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). 
 184. See Robert C. Mitchell, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/PY8S-Q8HT (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Mitchell) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 185. See Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *7  
[T]he following Class is certified: All persons with qualified mobility 
disabilities who were or will be denied the full and equal enjoyment of 
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of 
any Steak ‘n Shake restaurant location in the United States on the 
basis of a disability because such persons encountered accessibility 
barriers at any Steak ‘n Shake restaurant where Defendant owns, 
controls and/or operates the parking facilities.  
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The Third Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge D. 
Brooks Smith,186 based its reversal in part on a disagreement 
about the class certification requirement of numerosity, which in 
turn was based on the judges’ different views of inferences.187 
While there is no exact number that satisfies numerosity, courts 
generally state that approximately forty class members are 
enough.188 Under Third Circuit precedent, class certification “calls 
for a rigorous analysis in which ‘[f]actual determinations 
supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of 
the evidence.’”189 So, what was the evidence that did or did not 
support an inference that the class was so numerous that joinder 
would be impracticable? 
The trial court was persuaded that the numerosity 
requirement was met by these pieces of information: 1) census data 
showing that there are between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons 
with mobility disabilities who live in the United States;190 2) the 
statement of a Steak ‘n Shake executive that “thousands of people 
with disabilities utilize [Steak ‘n Shake] parking lots . . . each 
year”;191 3) plaintiffs’ identification of eight locations in 
 
 186. See Brooks Smith, BALLOTPEDIA, https://perma.cc/L249-JD5F (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2019) (providing general information on Judge Smith) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 187. The trial and appellate courts also disagreed about the commonality 
requirement. Mielo, 897 F.3d at 487–90.  The district court found the requirement 
to be met based on the inferences from facts in the record: that Steak ‘n Shake 
applied the same policies on parking lot access nationwide. Mielo, 2017 WL 
1519544, at *6. Their disagreement, however, turned less on inferences and more 
on breadth of the district court’s definition of the class, which could be read to 
include all types of “accessibility barriers” despite the definition’s reference to 
parking facilities. Id. at *7. 
 188. See Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]f the 
named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, 
the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.”).  
 189. Mielo, 897 F.3d 483–84 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2009)). Not all circuits require proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Terrill v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 
295 F.R.D. 671, 682 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (using an “in fact” standard, rather than a 
preponderance of the evidence standard).  
 190. Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *5; see also Mielo, 897 F.3d at 486 (“Plaintiffs 
point to census data showing that ‘there are between 14.9 million to 20.9 million 
persons with mobility disabilities who live in the United States’”) (quoting 
Appellee Brief at 41, Mielo, 897 F.3d 467 (No. 17-2678)). 
 191. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Class Certification at 9, Mielo, 
No. 2:15-cv-00180, 2017 WL 1519544 (“[I]t would ‘be fair to say that thousands of 
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Pennsylvania and Ohio with noncompliant parking lots;192 4) the 
existence of more than 400 Steak ‘n Shake restaurants in the 
United States potentially subject to the class’s claims;193 and 5) the 
special difficulties that arose because the group of putative class 
members “include[d] a potentially high number of individuals with 
mobility disabilities from multiple states.”194 The plaintiffs urged 
the court to use its “common sense” to conclude that the 
numerosity requirement was satisfied, and it did so.195 
The Third Circuit judges reached the opposite conclusion.196 
Mentioning the census data and characterizing the executive 
statement as a “single off-hand comment . . . speculating [about 
numbers],” those judges believed that what the plaintiffs saw as 
common sense was really “mere speculation.”197 Their opinion 
states: 
Plaintiffs’ first strand of evidence—indicating that there are 
between 14.9 million to 20.9 million persons with mobility 
disabilities who live in the United States—suggests that it is 
highly likely that at least 40 of those individuals would have 
experienced access violations at one of the Steak ‘n Shake 
locations at issue in this litigation. But although those odds 
might be enough for a good wager, we must be mindful that 
“[m]ere speculation as to the number of class members—even if 
such speculation is ‘a bet worth making’—cannot support a 
finding of numerosity.”198 
 
people with disabilities utilize th[e] parking spaces and visit Steak ‘n Shake stores 
every year’” (quoting Duffner Deposition at 68:19–69:5)). 
 192. Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., No. 15-180, 2017 WL 1519544, 
at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017). 
 193. See id. at *6 (noting the restaurant chain’s pervasiveness). 
 194. See id. at *5 (describing joinder as particularly difficult given the 
disabilities that impair plaintiffs’ ability to travel). 
 195. Compare Mielo v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 897 F.3d 467, 486 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (“Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their Rule 23(a)(1) burden.”), with 
Mielo, 2017 WL 1519544, at *14–15 (coming to the opposite conclusion). 
 196. See Mielo, 897 F.3d at 491 (declining to follow the plaintiff’s “common 
sense” logic). 
 197. Id. at 484. 
 198. Id. at 486 (emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 
F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
1608 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019) 
Without more direct or specific evidence of the number of 
disabled individuals who actually patronized a Steak ‘n Shake 
restaurant and experienced an ADA violation there, the judges on 
the Third Circuit found an inference of numerosity to be 
unsupported by the evidence.199 Although it employed an abuse of 
discretion standard of review,200 the court noted that plaintiffs 
seeking class certification must prove the facts supporting the Rule 
23(a) requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.201 The 
existence of at least forty class members was not, to those judges, 
more believable than a contrary inference.202 
V. Judges and Heuristics 
The hypothetical in Part III and real rulings in Part IV show 
judges drawing different inferences based on the same underlying 
facts. This Part will describe the empirical literature showing the 
ways in which mental shortcuts (“heuristics”), which can vary with 
individuals’ experiences and attitudes, may explain why inferences 
can vary so dramatically from judge to judge. Not surprisingly, the 
literature does not test all heuristics or all types of decisions, but 
this sample shows that judges’ expertise does not usually protect 
them from the operation of intuitive thought processes. 
A. Introduction to Heuristics: Unconscious Shortcuts 
Judges’ generalizations operate through the reasoning 
mechanisms that human brains use. Like most cognition, judicial 
 
 199. The appellate panel’s decision may also have been influenced by its dim 
view of the merits. See Mielo, 897 F.3d at 475 (“Despite the novelty of these 
interpretations, Steak ‘n Shake has not yet filed a motion to dismiss or motion for 
summary judgment.”). 
 200. Id. at 474. 
 201. See id. at 484 (“Although this strengthening of the numerosity inquiry 
has sometimes been criticized, our precedent nonetheless demands that a court 
‘make a factual determination, based on the preponderance of the evidence, that 
Rule 23’s requirements have been met.’” (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., 
L.L.C., 687 F.3d 583, 596 (3d Cir. 2012))).  
 202. See id. at 487 (rejecting a finding of numerosity). The Third Circuit also 
reviewed de novo the district judge’s legal framework, and rejected what it 
characterized as his “when in doubt, certify the class” approach. Id. at 483–84. 
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fact finding often happens under circumstances of incomplete 
information and limited processing time.203 Psychologists use a 
number of different labels to describe how humans think, but they 
recognize distinct roles for intuition and deliberation.204 Intuitive 
processes (System 1) operate quickly, often unconsciously, are 
relatively effortless, and are susceptible to emotional influences.205 
“System 1 is radically insensitive to both the quality and quantity 
of the information that give rise to impressions and intuitions.”206 
Deliberative processes (System 2), on the other hand, move more 
slowly because they require conscious work and the application of 
rules.207 The two systems interact, and the intuitive inferences, 
which are automatically gathered, affect more deliberative 
decisions in a number of ways.208 Despite the intervention of 
System 2 thinking, the influence of System 1 rarely ceases.209 
System 1 employs various heuristics to help make those quick 
evaluations.210 Although accurate and helpful in many situations, 
they can also lead to unreliable conclusions.211 Keep in mind that 
 
 203. See James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV. 
207, 230 (2019) (“The empirical literature on judicial susceptibility to cognitive 
biases shows that judges’ training and experience leave them better prepared to 
resist some forms of cognitive error, but on the whole, does not diverge from the 
cognitive processes of laypersons . . . .”). 
 204. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 6–9 (discussing the judicial 
decision-making process). As Guthrie notes, “[t]he convergence of psychologists 
on the notion that two separate systems of reasoning coexist in the human brain 
is remarkable.” Id. at 9 n.49; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing 
the mental process of impression, intuition, and decision).  
 205. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7 (describing the qualities of System 1 
intuitive processes).  
 206. KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 86. 
 207. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7–8 (describing System 2 deliberate 
processes). 
 208. See id. at 9 (detailing how System 1 processes and reacts to situations as 
they arise, and System 2 analyzes the quality of decision making made by 
intuition). 
 209. KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 85–86 (discussing how System 1 and System 
2 interact even when systematically approaching evidence through System 2). 
 210. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 7 (describing System 1 as 
“heuristic-based” (quoting KEITH E. STANOVICH & RICHARD F. WEST, Individual 
Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421, 436–38 (2002))). 
 211. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
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System 1 heuristics operate automatically—these mental 
processes are intuitive and powerful, affecting thought in a way 
that is hidden from the conscious, deliberate System 2.212 Its 
efficient operation also means that it does not keep track of 
discarded possibilities—System 1 loves coherence and makes 
available a collection of information that fits together and is 
compatible with the person’s overall worldview.213 
This subsection will highlight some of the heuristics that are 
relevant to judicial inferences and whose impact on judges have 
been studied. 
Availability. We make judgments about how likely something 
is based on how easily examples come to mind—how “available” 
they are.214 That could be based on how many examples one has 
encountered, and to that extent it is related to frequency, which is 
related to probability. But it is also affected by other things that 
make something “available” (i.e. memorable): things like dramatic 
content, personal impact, and visual stimulation.215 The 
availability heuristic can make people think sharks kill more 
people than ponies, or that they are more likely to die from a 
terrorist attack than from heart disease. The operation of the 
availability heuristic for any particular individual will be 
influenced by that person’s experiences, since they impact what 
information is “available” to System 1’s quick search.216 
Representativeness. The “representativeness” heuristic causes 
people to estimate probability using the similarity of one thing to 
the person’s mental image of the corresponding stereotype.217 
 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–30 (1974) 
[hereinafter Uncertainty] (discussing biases resulting from use of 
representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and anchoring heuristic). 
 212. See supra notes 207–210 and accompanying text.  
 213. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 85 (“The measure of success for System 
1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create.”). 
 214. See id. at 129 (“We defined the availability heuristic as the process of 
judging frequency by ‘the ease with which instances come to mind.’”). 
 215. See id. at 130 (using examples such as plane crashes to demonstrate 
events and experiences that would bias a person to believe such events are more 
common than in actuality). 
 216. See id. (discussing “personal experiences, pictures, and vivid examples” 
as examples of the availability heuristic). 
 217. See id. at 149 (describing the representativeness heuristic as ignoring 
statistics and the veracity of a claim in favor of a bias that connects stereotypes 
with a given outcome);  Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1124–25 (detailing 
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When people rely on representativeness to make judgments, they 
are likely to judge wrongly because the fact that something is more 
representative does not actually make it more likely. The 
representativeness heuristic can lead “to serious errors, because 
similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by several 
factors that should affect judgments of probability.”218 For 
example, it is insensitive to the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the 
stereotype.219 And stereotypes are influenced by the person’s own 
experiences and understanding of the way the world works.220 
Confirmation. This heuristic is defined as “the seeking or 
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”221 It operates as part of 
System 1 thinking.222 Confirmation bias leads people to find and 
interpret information in a way that supports preexisting 
hypotheses and to avoid information or interpretations that 
support alternate possibilities.223 It can also take the form of giving 
greater weight to information supporting a position one has taken 
or remembering that supporting information more readily than 
information that disconfirms the belief.224 This is particularly 
common “in situations that are inherently complex and 
ambiguous”—those that are “characterized by interactions among 
numerous variables and in which the cause and effect 
 
representativeness heuristics). 
 218. Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1124. 
 219. See id. at 1124–25 (describing the “insensitivity to prior probability of 
outcomes,” sample size, and predictability). 
 220. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 146–49 (discussing how stereotypes from 
one’s own experiences influence a person toward certain beliefs and outcomes). 
 221. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in 
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
 222.  See supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text (describing System 1 
cognition).  
 223. See Nickerson, supra note 221, at 187 (“People are more likely to question 
information that conflicts with preexisting beliefs than information that is 
consistent with them and are more likely to see ambiguous information to be 
confirming preexisting beliefs than disconfirming of them.”). 
    224. See id. at 191 (providing political examples where confirmation bias 
involves “intentional selectivity in the use of information for the conscious 
purpose of supporting a position”). 
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relationships are obscure . . . .”225 Like the availability heuristic, 
the operation of any particular person’s confirmation bias very 
much turns on that person’s experience and view of “common 
sense.”226 
Affect. The affect heuristic leads people to decisions that are 
consistent with their emotions.227 “Do I like it? Do I hate it? How 
strongly do I feel about it?”228  
Emotions influence how people perceive others, what they 
remember about others, and how they process information 
about others. Emotions guide “people’s attitudes, beliefs, and 
inferential strategies” so that they see people they like as 
having positive qualities and people they do not like as 
possessing negative ones. Consequently, even deliberative 
reasoning can be influenced by intuitive, emotional 
reactions.229 
System 2 is particularly ineffective in overcoming the affect 
heuristic.230 
Anchoring. When people estimate numerical values, they 
often rely on an initial value available to them and adjust from 
there—hence the anchor metaphor.231 This can be rational and 
helpful.232 But it turns out that the heuristic is at play even when 
 
 225. Id. at 191–92.  
 226. See id. at 175 (defining confirmation bias as interpreting evidence partial 
to one’s “existing beliefs” informed by one’s experience and view of what 
constitutes “common sense”). 
 227. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 139 (“The affect heuristic is an instance 
of substitution, in which the answer to an easy question (How do I feel about it?) 
serves as an answer to a much harder question (What do I think about it?).”). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law 
or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 869 (2015) [hereinafter Heart 
Versus Head] (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 493 (1990)). 
 230. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 103–04 (“In the context of 
attitudes . . . System 2 is more of an apologist for the emotions of System 1 than 
a critic of those emotions—an endorser rather than an enforcer.”). 
 231. See Uncertainty, supra note 211, at 1128–30 (“[D]ifferent starting points 
yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We call this 
phenomenon anchoring.”). 
 232. See id. at 1129 (noting that anchoring reduces mental effort but often 
leads to errors).  
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it makes no sense at all, such as when the number is unrelated to 
the number to be estimated.233 
Another form of anchoring is not about numbers.234 Everyday 
social interactions (as well as judicial decisions) require humans to 
infer the thoughts and feelings of other people. In order to figure 
this out, people use themselves as a kind of “anchor” to estimate 
the intent and emotions of others and adjust from there depending 
on how similar or dissimilar from themselves the other person 
seems to be.235 “For example, to infer another’s mental state, one 
might first mentally imagine experiencing that person’s situation, 
read off the evoked mental state, and then assume that the other 
person would feel similarly.”236 This process, sometimes called 
“self-referencing,” works very much like anchoring with 
numbers.237  
When people use themselves as an anchor point, if the other 
person’s experiences are different, the inference will be unreliable 
unless it is adjusted to account for dissimilarities.238 (The 
adjustment may use System 2 deliberative thinking.)239 This can 
work relatively well so long as the “other” is fairly similar and 
sufficient adjustments are made. However, one study found that 
when the “other” is not perceived as similar, the people doing the 
 
 233. See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 788 (describing an experiment in 
which providing participants with a random number affected their estimates of 
the percentage of the United Nations membership made up of African countries). 
 234. See generally Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Anchoring and 
Adjustment During Social Inferences, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 151 
(2013) [hereinafter Anchoring and Adjustment].  
 235. See id. (“Although humans cannot ever directly access the goings-on of 
others’ minds, we can gain insight into the ways that others think or feel by 
simulating their experience in our own mind.”). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Hsiao H. D’Ailly, Harry G. Murray & Alice Corkill, Cognitive Effects 
of Self-Referencing, 20 CONT. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 88, 88 (1995) (giving an overview of 
self-referencing). 
 238. See id. (“[A] perceiver must have experiences that are relevant to those 
of the social inference target. If this is not the case, a perceiver’s self-knowledge 
likely will not apply to the target and so cannot provide an informative starting 
point for understanding the target’s experience.”). 
 239. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 9, at 120 (“There is a form of anchoring that 
occurs in a deliberate process of adjustment, an operation of System 2.”). 
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inferring do not use self-referencing as an anchor.240 Instead, they 
fall back on stereotypes.241 
Hindsight. “[O]nce people know the outcome of an event, they 
tend to overestimate what could have been anticipated in 
foresight.”242 Experimenters have detected hindsight bias in a wide 
array of situations, including “general-knowledge questions, in 
political or business developments, in predictions of elections or 
sport results, in medical diagnoses or in personality assessment,” 
and more.243 
Egocentric heuristics and biases. In addition to 
self-referencing, a cluster of self-centered biases can also affect 
judicial decisions. One is “egocentric bias,” a tendency to have a 
higher opinion of oneself than reality would support.244 This can 
make people overconfident in the accuracy of their opinions.245 A 
second is the “false consensus effect,” in which people overestimate 
the degree to which others agree with their beliefs, which also 
creates overconfidence.246 Those biases are related to “naïve 
realism,” the human tendency to believe that we see the world 
around us objectively, and that people who disagree with us must 
be uninformed, irrational, or biased.247 One consequence of naïve 
 
 240. See Anchoring and Adjustment, supra note 234, at 160 (noting the limits 
of self-referencing). 
 241. For studies confirming this phenomenon in legal settings, see Richard L. 
Wiener et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: The Effects of Gender, Legal 
Standard, and Ambivalent Sexism, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1997); Jason A. 
Cantone & Richard L. Weiner, Religion at Work: Evaluating Hostile Work 
Environment Religious Discrimination Claims, 23 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 351 
(2017). 
 242. IRESEARCHNET, https://perma.cc/P9RC-5WA5 (last visited Oct. 29, 2018) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 243.  Id. 
 244. DANIEL L. SCHACTER ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 254 (2d. ed. 2011).  
 245.  See, e.g., Anna Sundström, Self-Assessment of Driving Skill: A Review 
from a Measurement Perspective, 11 TRANSP. RES. PART F: TRAFFIC PSYCHOL. & 
BEHAV. 1, 1 (2008) (explaining that a majority of respondents rate themselves 
above average in driving skill and safety). 
 246.  See Lee Ross et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in 
Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
279, 297 (1977) (explaining that such biases “both foster and justify the actor’s 
feelings that his own behavioral choices are appropriate”). 
 247.  Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications 
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 
110– 11 (T. Brown et al. eds., 1996). 
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realism is referred to as the “bias blind spot,” which is the ability 
to recognize cognitive and motivational biases in others while 
failing to recognize the impact of bias on the self.248 Sadly, when 
people form beliefs based on heuristics they may well be both 
confident that the decisions are correct and unaware of the impact 
of those heuristics on the decisions.249 
B. Heuristics Affect Judicial Decisions 
It would be tempting to believe that judges, because of their 
high intelligence, extensive education, and professional experience 
would not be subject to heuristic-based reasoning flaws. Sadly, this 
is not true.250 Some of the evidence for that is circumstantial 
research on other types of professional experts—including doctors, 
real estate agents, psychologists, options traders, military leaders, 
and auditors—showing that they rely on heuristic biases.251 Even 
more tellingly, empirical studies of actual judges show that 
heuristics influence judicial tasks.252  
Many of the contemporary studies of trial court 
decision-making have been done by the trio of Professors Jeff 
Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew 
Wistrich (hereinafter RGW).253 Overall, those studies of hundreds 
 
 248. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self 
Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 374 (2002). 
 249. See id. at 378 (concluding that knowledge of biases “neither prevents one 
from succumbing nor makes one aware of having done so”). 
 250. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 31 (finding that “heuristic-based decision 
making” led to erroneous decisions); Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 829 
(asserting that judges make mistakes based on “cognitive illusions”).  
 251.  See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 782–83 (referencing empirical 
studies on many types of professionals); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the 
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1229–30 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind] (identifying research focused on certain experts). 
 252. See Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1230 (referencing a 
study suggesting that bankruptcy judges “are susceptible to the ‘self-serving’ or 
‘egocentric’ bias when making judgments”).  
 253. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 3 (noting the impact of heuristics); 
Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 780 (demonstrating that judges’ reliance on 
heuristics “can create cognitive illusions that produce erroneous judgments”); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009) [hereinafter Unconscious Racial Bias] 
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of federal and state judges show that “judges rely on heuristics that 
can lead to systematically erroneous judgments.”254 Administering 
a “cognitive reflection test” to judges showed that “judges tended 
to favor intuitive rather than deliberative faculties.”255 That test, 
however, asks questions unrelated to judging.256 Judicial task case 
studies also showed that judges tend to be influenced by heuristics 
such as anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias.257 Further, 
tests showed that judges have difficulty deliberately disregarding 
inadmissible evidence.258 
To make this more concrete, consider some examples. First, in 
order to test whether judges are affected by anchoring, one RGW 
study presented participating judges with a hypothetical lawsuit 
arising out of an automobile accident.259 The control group judges 
were given the facts and asked “[h]ow much would you award the 
plaintiff in compensatory damages?”260 Judges in the anchor group 
were given identical information, but they were also told of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing 
that the amount in controversy was lower than the required 
$75,000.01.261 Judges were asked to rule on the motion and then, 
if they did not dismiss the case, asked the same question about 
compensatory damages.262 The judges’ responses showed that the 
 
(reporting results of “the first study of implicit racial bias among judges”); 
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1230 (exploring whether 
specialization influences the impact of heuristics on judges); Andrew J. Wistrich 
et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding, 53 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258 (2005) [hereinafter Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information] (testing the ability of trial judges “to disregard 
inadmissible information”); Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 862 (studying 
whether judges’ feelings about litigants affect their decision making). 
 254.  Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 784. 
 255.  Blinking, supra note 37, at 17. 
 256.  See id. at 10 (describing the Cognitive Reflection Test). 
 257.  Id. at 19–27. 
 258.  See Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at 
1264–70 (noting that even inadmissible evidence that is deliberately avoided can 
indirectly influence judgment). 
 259. Blinking, supra note 37, at 20. 
 260. Id. at 21. 
 261. Id.   
 262.  Because the plaintiff as described clearly had incurred damages 
exceeding $75,000, the researchers regarded the motion to dismiss as meritless, 
and only two out of 116 judges would have granted it. Id. 
(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING  1617 
  
$75,000 served as an anchor: judges who had not ruled on the 
motion (i.e. no anchor) awarded the plaintiff an average of 
$1,249,000, but judges who had been exposed to the motion 
awarded the plaintiff an average of only $882,000.263 The 
difference was statistically significant; the average award of the 
anchor group was thirty percent lower.264 “The anchor triggered 
intuitive, automatic processing that the judges were unable to 
override.”265 The judges’ inferences about damages were influenced 
by the anchor.266 
A test of hindsight bias informed judges about the outcome on 
appeal of a case involving Rule 11 sanctions.267 The judges were all 
given the same fact pattern, except that they were given one of 
three different appellate outcomes.268 They were then asked, in 
light of the fact pattern and all three possible outcomes, which of 
the outcomes had been the most likely.269 In each case, judges 
found the outcome they had originally been given to be 
significantly more likely.270 “Learning an outcome clearly 
influenced the judges’ ex post assessments of the ex ante likelihood 
of various possible outcomes. The intuitive notion that the past 
was predictable prevailed.”271 
 
 263. See id. (showing the power of anchoring). 
 264. See Judicial Mind, supra note 26, at 791 (displaying the statistical proof 
of the effect of anchoring). 
 265.  Blinking, supra note 37, at 21. 
 266. In another hypothetical, judges were either told of a $10 million 
settlement demand or just told that the plaintiff “was intent upon collecting a 
significant monetary payment.” Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, 
supra note 253, at 1288 n.150. The $10 million acted as a high anchor, resulting 
in a significant increase in the judges’ damage awards despite otherwise identical 
fact patterns. Id. at 1288–92. 
 267. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 24–25 (outlining facts in a hypothetical 
in which the district court found “that the plaintiff knew his claims were not 
actionable because he had made similar claims several years earlier in a case that 
had been dismissed by the trial court”).  
 268. See id. at 25 (“Each judge randomly received one of three conditions: 
‘Affirmed,’ ‘Vacated,’ or ‘Lesser Sanction.’”). 
 269. Id. 
 270. See id. at 25–26 (finding that a large percentage of judges in each group 
asserted that they would have predicted the outcome).  
 271.  Id. at 26. However, in another test of hindsight bias the judges were not 
affected by learning about the fruits of an arguably illegal search. See infra note 
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In an RGW study designed to test judges’ ability to disregard 
inadmissible evidence, both control group and “suppression” 
judges were given information about available evidence in a 
contract dispute between Jones, a freelance consultant, and 
SmithFilms, a movie studio.272 The hypothetical lawsuit turned on 
whether Smith, the studio owner, had offered Jones “producer 
credit.”273 Jones claimed that he had; the studio denied it.274 The 
only writing in the case was a short letter specifying that Jones 
would receive “other consideration as agreed upon by the parties 
during the pre-signing breakfast.”275 To corroborate his own 
testimony, Jones offered the testimony of a waitress who said she 
overheard a mention of producer credit.276 Smith was in a coma (!), 
so SmithFilms could offer only testimony that SmithFilms did not 
generally offer producer credit.277 
Both groups of judges were given this description and asked 
whether they would rule for Jones or SmithFilms.278 But the judges 
assigned to the “suppression” group first had to rule on the 
admissibility of an audiotape of a post-negotiation conversation 
between Jones and his attorney, with Jones objecting that the tape 
was protected by the attorney-client privilege (and under the facts 
of the hypothetical, that was the more likely conclusion).279 On the 
tape, Jones admits that he had not actually asked for the producer 
credit, and there was no such agreement.280 Although the judges 
otherwise had identical information, the judges’ awareness of the 
plaintiff’s admission significantly decreased his win rate.281 “In the 
 
310 and accompanying text. 
 272.  Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at 
1294– 95. 
 273. Id. at 1294. 
 274. Id. at 1295. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 1335.  
 277. See id. at 1295 (describing testimony that served as the basis for the 
hypothetical).  
 278. Id. at 1296. 
 279. See id. at 1295 (framing the issue as whether Jones was seeking legal 
advice or business advice).  
 280. See id. (“Jones: I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for 
producer credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it.”).  
 281. See id. at 1296 (noting the effect of a slight change in fact on the 
hypothetical plaintiff’s win rate).  
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control condition [no tape], 55.6% (25 out of 45) of the judges found 
for the plaintiff. . . . Among those who ruled that the audiotape was 
privileged, only 29.2% (7 out of 24) found for the plaintiff.”282 Even 
judges who had ruled the tape out of bounds, then, let the 
knowledge they gained from the tape influence the inferences on 
which they based their judgments.283 
The RGW researchers also examined whether judges were 
subject to the affect heuristic, using a number of hypotheticals on 
hundreds of judges over a period of years.284 While judges no doubt 
strive to avoid the influence of emotions or non-merits values on 
their decisions, the results again show the impact of intuitive 
processes.285 For example, the researchers gave a problem 
involving illegal immigration to 508 judges.286 The judges were told 
that they were presiding over the prosecution of an immigrant 
illegally in the country.287 The defendant was a Peruvian citizen 
who pasted a forged U.S. entry visa into his legitimate Peruvian 
passport.288 The judges were told that the defendant was charged 
with “forging an identification card,”289 and given the language of 
the relevant statute. The statute’s application to these facts was 
open to interpretation.290 
The judges were divided into two groups.291 One was told that 
the defendant was a killer who had been hired by a drug cartel to 
sneak into the U.S. to “track down someone who had stolen drug 
 
 282.  Id.  
 283. See id. at 1297 (recognizing that the evidence, even while inadmissible, 
influenced the judges).  
 284. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 874 (noting that data was 
collected from 2008 to 2013 using a written questionnaire with three to five 
hypothetical cases). 
 285. See id. at 911 (providing statistical results).  
 286.  See id. at 877 (including 100 federal trial judges from a variety of 
districts, eighty state and federal appellate judges, eighty-six newly appointed 
New York trial judges, and 242 Ohio judges).  
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. 
 289. Id.  
 290. See id. (discussing the issue of “whether pasting a fake visa onto a 
genuine passport constituted forgery of an identification document”).  
 291. Id. 
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proceeds . . . .”292 The other group was told the defendant was a 
father who had tried to sneak into the U.S. to earn money so he 
could pay for a liver transplant to save the life of his critically ill, 
nine-year-old daughter.293 There was, therefore, a huge difference 
in the sympathy one would likely feel for the defendant—but not a 
difference relevant to whether pasting a forged visa into a 
legitimate passport constituted forging an identification card.294  
Did it affect the judges’ decisions? Yes, and pretty 
dramatically.295 “Among the judges who reviewed the father 
version, [only] 44% (102 out of 234) ruled that the act constituted 
forgery, as compared to 60% (154 out of 257) out of the judges who 
reviewed the killer version.”296 
C. When Does Professional Expertise Intervene? 
Although they have not tested all possible heuristics, it seems 
clear from the RGW studies that judges as a group unwittingly 
employ intuitive thinking on a regular basis.297 But their research 
also shows that occasionally, professional training and habits of 
mind allow judges to override the misleading influence of System 
1.298 This could happen in a couple of ways. 
First, under some circumstances experts can develop such 
extensive, specific knowledge and skills that a mental operation 
that would normally be a System 2 (deliberative) task becomes 
automatic and intuitive.299 Chess grandmasters, for example, 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 877–78. 
 294. See id. at 878 (detailing the effects of including facts about a hypothetical 
defendants’ sick child).  
 295. For an overview of the study results, see id.  
 296.  Id. For another study showing a powerful unacknowledged influence of 
defendants’ characteristics on judicial reasoning, see Holger Spamann & Lars 
Klohn, Justice is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic than We Thought: Evidence from 
an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255 (2016) (finding that 
defendant characteristics have a strong effect).  
 297. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 861 (“The belief that judges 
cannot be as dispassionate as their roles demand is widespread.”).  
    298.  See Blinking, supra note 37, at 30 (“[R]ecent research suggests that some 
experts use intuitive thinking successfully.”). 
 299.  See ROBIN HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 204 (2001) (“Many processes 
or reactions to stimuli that once relied heavily on the deliberate system can over 
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develop such a deep sense of the game that they intuitively 
recognize patterns.300 However, it is unlikely that judges often 
acquire a level of internalized reflection that would protect them 
from the operation of heuristics.301 The conditions under which 
judges work (complex, varying decisions and limited feedback) are 
a serious impediment to developing the kind of deep but automatic 
pattern recognition that helps chess masters.302 
Second, judges’ training and practice in legal reasoning seems 
to allow System 2 deliberative thinking to overcome the influence 
of heuristics when the decision in question is about law application 
and is governed by a web of quite specific rules (as compared to 
discretionary decisions, general standards, or balancing tests).303 
In one RGW test, designed to see if judges tend to err based on the 
hindsight heuristic, all of the judges were given the same core set 
of facts: 
A police officer was on patrol outside a rock concert. The officer 
saw a well-dressed, nervous-looking man exit a BMW and fiddle 
with something in the trunk before he entered the concert. A 
half hour later, the officer noticed that one of the BMW’s 
windows was down. Concerned that someone might burglarize 
the car, he approached to close the window. Upon reaching the 
car, he smelled something that he believed, based on a 
demonstration at a training session several years earlier, to be 
burnt methamphetamine. He looked inside the car and didn’t 
 
time become automatic and thus bypass consciousness. This migration from the 
deliberate system to the tacit [system] is an important characteristic of the 
phenomenon of expertise.”). 
 300.  See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: 
Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 51 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel 
Kahneman eds., 2002) (“A demonstration of the intelligence of System [1] is the 
ability of chess masters to perceive the strength or weakness of chess positions 
instantly.”). 
 301. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 32 (noting that the appeals process most 
judges face does not allow the development of an analytical process). 
 302.  See id. (“[J]udges operate in an environment that does not allow them to 
perfect their intuitive decision-making processes.”). 
    303.  See id. at 28 (“[T]his work suggests that judges are inclined, at least 
when presented with certain stimuli, to make intuitive decisions, but that they 
have the capacity to override intuition with deliberative thinking.”).  
1622 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019) 
see any drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local map, and a 
couple of empty beer cans.304 
Participating judges were divided into two groups. The 
“foresight” judges were asked to say, based on these facts, whether 
this information supplied sufficient probable cause that they would 
issue a telephonic search warrant when called by the officer.305 The 
“hindsight” judges, however, were told that the police officer 
“conducted a warrantless search of the trunk and found ten pounds 
of methamphetamine, other drug paraphernalia, and a recently 
fired gun that had been used earlier in the day to murder a drug 
dealer across town.”306 Judges in that group were asked to rule on 
a motion to suppress the evidence found in that warrantless 
search, because the officer lacked probable cause.307 
If the hindsight bias was at work, one would expect judges who 
were aware of the contents of the trunk to rule in favor of the police 
at a higher rate, even though in both cases the legal issue was 
probable cause to search the car.308 But that’s not what happened: 
the responses of the foresight and hindsight groups were extremely 
similar.309 What explains this unusual result? One possibility is 
that the judges used System 2 deliberation, applying the legal 
analysis demanded by the Fourth Amendment, to rule without 
regard to what was found in the warrantless search.310 This could 
be true because there is a large array of rules to apply and because 
“the intricacy of this area of law signals to the judge that intuition 
might be inconsistent with law and therefore they will need to 
 
 304.  Id. at 26–27. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id.  
 307. Id.  
 308. See id. at 28 (underscoring the basic premises of the study). 
 309. Id. at 27.  
 310.  See id. at 28 (characterizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as 
“highly intricate” and “rule-bound”). In contrast, a different test of hindsight bias 
showed that judges were influenced by knowledge of the outcome of an appeal 
when asked to identify the most likely ex ante ruling on a Rule 11 motion for 
sanctions—a decision granting the judge far wider discretion, governed by more 
general standards. See Blinking, supra note 37, at 25–26. Numerous other studies 
have shown judges to be influenced by hindsight bias in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at 1316 (“The vast 
literature on the hindsight bias includes virtually no studies that fail to uncover 
evidence of the hindsight bias in ex post assessments of ex ante probabilities.”). 
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think through the rules created by the appellate courts 
carefully.”311 This explanation is consistent with a study (using 
undergraduates and law students as subjects) finding that legal 
training reduced bias from stereotyping when the subjects had 
been taught legal rules that applied to the cases they were given, 
but did not reduce bias when the training covered more general 
standards.312  
It is important to note, though, that this experiment was based 
on stipulated facts and is about application of well-established law 
to those facts. It does not speak to the inference drawing/fact 
finding process and whether it would be influenced by hindsight 
bias.313 But the reality of most pretrial disputes may well be that 
the facts are not agreed. For example, in a motion to suppress in a 
criminal case such as this one, if the question is whether to believe 
an officer’s testimony that a defendant made a furtive motion or 
consented to a search, judges’ decisions about whom to believe 
could well be influenced by what they know about the fruits of the 
search.314 
Another possibility is that, given the frequency of probable 
cause hearings, judges develop rule-of-thumb heuristics applicable 
to common fact patterns in order to guide their rulings.315 They 
might, for example, refuse to find probable cause based only on 
vague assertions that the police smelled drugs or refuse to find 
probable cause for most car-trunk searches.316 In either case, this 
study provides evidence that some circumstances—particularly 
 
 311.  Blinking, supra note 37, at 27. 
 312.  See Erik J. Girvan, Wise Restraints?: Learning Legal Rules, Not 
Standards, Reduces the Effects of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making, 22 
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 31, 41 (2016) (finding stereotypic warmth when 
participants had no training and decided cases based on legal standards but no 
stereotypic warmth when participants did have legal training and decided cases 
in which legal rules applied).  
 313. See id. (explaining that the facts were given to participants rather than 
derived through a separate fact-finding process).  
 314.  I am indebted to Jeremy Fogel, former U.S. District Judge, former 
Director of the Federal Judicial Center, and current Executive Director of the 
Berkeley Judicial Institute, for this point and example. 
 315. See Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information, supra note 253, at 
1318 (noting the usefulness of these rule-of-thumb heuristics). 
 316.  See id. (providing examples of rule-of-thumb heuristics). 
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well-developed facts and intricate legal rules—can cue judges to 
use their professional analytical skills to trump the automatic 
heuristic response.317  
D. Implicit Bias 
This subpart looks at heuristics’ more insidious potential 
effects; they are the gateway to the operation of implicit biases 
based on factors such as race, gender, national origin, age, and 
religion. “Implicit biases are discriminatory biases based on 
implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes.”318 We say that these 
attitudes and stereotypes are implicit when the person holding 
them is not intentional or even conscious of the bias.319 They can 
be especially difficult for the law to deal with, because implicit 
biases may be different from a person’s conscious beliefs but 
nevertheless affect the person’s actions.320 
One very common way to try to measure degrees of implicit 
associations between stereotypes and individual images is the 
“Implicit Association Test” (IAT), which is administered by 
Harvard University,321 and has been taken by millions of people 
over the years.322 The IAT is a sorting test in which the subject is 
 
 317. See Girvan, supra note 312, at 41 (noting that judges are not always at 
the mercy of their heuristic responses). 
 318.  Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: 
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006). In social psychology, an 
“attitude” is “an evaluative disposition—that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or 
to act favorably or unfavorably toward, someone or something.” Id. at 948. A 
“stereotype” is “a mental association between a social group or category and a 
trait.” Id. at 949. For example, a stereotype might be an association between old 
people and driving skill, and the attitude (unfavorable) would be that older people 
are poor drivers.  
 319.  See id. at 946 (“[T]he science of implicit cognition suggests that actors do 
not always have conscious, internal control over the processes of social perception, 
impression formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.”). 
 320. See id. at 951 (describing the effect of implicit bias).  
 321.  See Project Implicit, HARV. UNIV. (2011), 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2019) (providing an 
online forum for users to discover their implicit associations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 322.  For a fuller discussion of the IAT, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., 
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association 
Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998). 
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asked to match categories and traits that are often associated with 
implicit biases—such as Male/Female sorted with 
Career/Family.323 It tends to take longer to tap the computer key 
that matches the categories with traits that are contrary to 
stereotypes.324 For example, it may take longer to match words or 
images associated with Female to those associated with Career 
than to those related to Family. Those time differences generate a 
score that reflects how strong an association the IAT-taker has 
between the category and the trait.325 A person taking the test 
described, for example, might learn that the test has shown them 
to have a mild association between Female and Family. The best 
known IAT focuses on race,326 but there are also tests looking at 
associations based on age, religion, political party, sexual 
orientation, mental illness, weight, and more.327 
 The collective results of years of IAT tests are worrying: 
In the case of race, scientists have found that most European 
Americans who have taken the test are faster at pairing a white 
face with a good word (e.g., honest) and a black face with a bad 
word (e.g., violent) than the other way around. For 
African-Americans, approximately a third show a preference for 
African-Americans, a third show a preference for European 
Americans, and a third show no preference.328 
Showing an unconscious association is not the same as 
showing that people act on that association, and research on the 
latter is ongoing.329 There is, however, evidence that implicit 
associations can affect decisions, including hiring,330 medical 
 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 1466. 
 325. See id. at 1465 (illustrating the association effects of the IAT using 
several examples).  
 326.  See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 318, at 952 (providing a detailed 
description of the tasks involved in this version of the IAT). 
 327. Id. at 949. 
 328.  Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. 
REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N  64, 64–65 (2013). 
 329. See, e.g., Oswald et al., Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A 
Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 
172–73 (2013). 
 330.  See, e.g. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor 
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treatment,331 and perceptions of a suspect’s dangerousness.332 
There are also studies that do not show a relationship between IAT 
scores and behavior.333 
There have been few experimental studies trying to assess 
judges’ implicit bias. The RGW trio did one test of black/white bias 
among generalist judges in criminal cases, using state court judges 
(133 state or local trial judges) as subjects.334 Their IAT results 
showed that judges, like most white Americans, more closely 
associate African Americans than whites with negative 
concepts.335 The results of their experiments showed that those 
biases sometimes influenced judgments in hypothetical cases.336 It 
also showed, though, that in some instances—when the judges 
were aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the 
influence of implicit racial bias and motivated to suppress 
it— judges could focus more consciously on the issue of race and 
compensate for their implicit bias.337  
Two of their tests did not involve explicit mentions of race, but 
were preceded by a subconscious “priming” task in which the test 
subjects were (or were not) exposed to words associated with black 
Americans.338 They found in both cases that “judges who expressed 
a white preference on the IAT were somewhat more likely to 
impose harsher penalties when primed with black-associated 
 
Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 991, 1011 (2004); Dan-Olof Rooth, 
Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence, 17 
LABOUR ECON. 523, 530 (2010). 
 331.  See Anthony Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its 
Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007) (detailing implicit bias within the medical 
profession). 
 332.  See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and 
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 
1006 (2007) (finding that police officers and general members of the community 
exhibit “robust racial bias” in decisions whether to shoot). 
 333. See Oswald et al., supra note 329, at 188 (“[T]he IAT provides little 
insight into who will discriminate against whom, and provides no more insight 
than explicit measures of bias.”).  
 334. Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1205. 
 335.  Id. at 1197. 
 336. Id. 
 337.  Id. at 1197, 1221. 
 338.  See id. at 1212–13 (examples include Harlem, homeboy, rap, basketball, 
gospel, Oprah, dreadlocks, welfare, rhythm, and soul). 
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words than when primed with neutral words, while judges who 
expressed a black preference on the IAT reacted in an opposite 
fashion to the priming conditions.”339  
On the other hand, when race was more explicit, there was no 
significant correlation between conviction and the judges’ IAT 
scores.340 “Judges who exhibited strong white preferences on the 
IAT did not judge the white and black defendants differently, and 
neither did judges who expressed black preferences on the IAT.”341 
The researchers attributed this result to the judges’ awareness 
(even though not told, most figured it out) that they were being 
studied for racial bias, and they were highly motivated to avoid 
being seen as biased in carrying out their assigned task.342  
Absent the triggering and motivation, there are grounds to 
worry that judges are not sufficiently self-aware to correct for bias. 
The same researchers asked a group of judges to rate their ability 
to “avoid racial prejudice in decision making”343 relative to other 
judges attending the same conference. Thirty-five out of thirty-six 
(97%) of the judges rated themselves in the top half, and eighteen 
out of the thirty-six (50%) rated themselves in the top quarter of 
ability.344 The RGW group noted, “We worry that this result means 
that judges are overconfident in their ability to avoid the influence 
 
 339.  Id. at 1217. 
 340. See id. at 1219 (“[W]e did not even find a marginally significant 
interaction here.”).  
 341.  Id. These results were quite different from results using the same 
materials as this third test by Professors Sommers & Ellsworth, who had only 
white subjects and who found that ninety percent of the participants who read 
about an African American defendant said that they would convict as compared 
to only seventy percent of participants who read about a Caucasian participant. 
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation 
of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL., 
PUB. POL’Y, & L. 201, 216–17 (2001). 
 342.  See Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1223–24 (suggesting 
that white judges “probably engaged in cognitive correction to avoid the 
appearance of bias”). 
 343. Id. at 1225.  
 344.  Id. This result is consistent with a study of administrative law judges: 
97.2% placed themselves in the top half compared to other attendees with respect 
to their capacity for avoiding bias in judging (50% in the top quartile and 47.2% 
in the second quartile). Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden” Judiciary: An 
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 
(2009). 
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of race and hence fail to engage in corrective processes on all 
occasions.”345 
As part of a larger experiment designed to see whether 
specialist judges would be more able to overcome heuristics, the 
RGW group tested whether the race of a debtor would affect the 
decision of a bankruptcy judge.346 They gave the judges an 
elaborate fact pattern involving discharge of student debt for 
undue hardship; the test for discharge required the judge to make 
findings about three specific factors.347 Everything was identical, 
except that the name of the debtor varied, using names that prior 
researchers had indicated were associated with African Americans 
or with Anglos.348 The results showed no statistically significant 
racial bias.349 Judges given debtors with African American 
sounding names discharged a mean of 56.2% of the debt ($47,106), 
while those given debtors with Anglo-sounding names discharged 
a mean of 57.9% ($48,506) of the debt.350 Although not correlated 
with race, it is interesting to note that Democratic judges 
discharged a mean of $50,972, while Republican judges discharged 
a mean of $34,232.351 This would seem to indicate that there was 
enough leeway involved in the decision to generate 
differences— but for this group of bankruptcy judges, political 
attitudes about debtors and government assistance were far more 
significant than race in influencing the judges’ decisions.352 
 
 345.  Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1226. 
 346.  See Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1245–47 (outlining the 
facts and materials involved in the problem). 
 347. Id. at 1247. 
 348.  Id. The names identified as African American-sounding were Ebony, 
Latonya, Kenya, Latoya, Tanisha, Lakisha, Tamika, Keisha, and Aisha. The 
names identified as Anglo-sounding were Kristen, Carrie, Laurie, Meredith, 
Sarah, Allison, Jill, Anne, and Emily. Id. These names were previously used on 
fake resumes in an employment-bias test conducted by Marianne Bertrand and 
Sendhil Mullainathan. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 330, at 1011. 
 349.  Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1247.  
 350.  Id. Some of the judges reported after the presentation of the test results 
that they did not remember the name of the debtors in their cases, perhaps 
because their attention was elsewhere. Id. at 1248. The factual and legal 
complexity of the task likely triggered the use of System 2 cognition.   
 351.  Id. at 1247–48. 
 352.  Id. at 1248. A different group of experimenters examined implicit bias 
targeting different groups, testing for implicit bias regarding Asian Americans 
and Jews. Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National Empirical 
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In observational studies examining the potential impact of 
judges’ personal characteristics, including race and gender, 
patterns emerge in cases in which that characteristic might be 
salient, indicating that the judges’ “experience” differs in ways that 
can affect outcomes. It would make sense that a judge’s lived 
experience as a member of a traditionally disadvantaged group 
might affect the inferences that the judge would draw. Many of the 
studies are in the context of the criminal justice system.353 On the 
civil side, one context is especially enlightening: cases alleging 
employment discrimination based on race or gender. For example, 
studies found that: 
• Female judges favored plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases relative to their male counterparts.354 
• For female trial judges, the average predicted probability of 
ruling for the sex discrimination plaintiff was thirty-five 
percent.355 For male judges, this number was only twenty 
percent.356 
• There was a 126% increase in the likelihood of a black trial 
judge ruling in favor of the EEOC’s race discrimination claim 
compared to a white trial judge.357 
• Plaintiffs in racial harassment cases were successful in 
forty-six percent of their cases before black judges but less 
than half as often before white judges; logistic regression 
analysis indicated that on average, plaintiffs before black 
 
Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 68–69 (2017). They administered 
the test to 180 federal judges and fifty-nine state judges. Id. at 68. On their IAT 
tests, the judges showed moderate to strong implicit bias against both Asians 
(relative to Caucasians) and Jews (relative to Christians). Id. 
 353.  See, e.g., Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1218 (finding that 
in a hypothetical battery case “black judges were significantly more willing to 
convict the defendant when he was identified as Caucasian rather than as African 
American”).  
 354.  Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal 
Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 436 (1994). 
 355.  Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial 
Judges’ Sex and Race, 69 POL. RES. Q. 788, 793 (2016). 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id. at 793–94. Black judges were also more likely than white judges to 
rule in favor of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. Id. at 794. 
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judges were 3.3 times more likely to win than before white 
judges.358  
One recent study is intriguing, supporting the possibility that 
the judge’s experience, rather than sheer identity alone, can affect 
inferences.359 Using a data set on judges’ families and a data set of 
nearly 1,000 gender related cases, Professors Glynn and Sen found 
that judges with at least one daughter vote in a more liberal 
fashion on gender issues than judges with no daughter.360 “The 
effect is robust and appears driven largely by male Republican 
appointees.”361 The most likely explanation: “having daughters 
leads judges to learn about issues that they ordinarily would not 
be exposed to—such as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, 
Title IX, and reproductive rights issues.”362 In other words, having 
daughters can change the judges’ experience and view of the world 
in ways that makes inferences in favor of female litigants more 
plausible.363 
Federal judges in particular live in a somewhat rarified, elite 
environment in which they are isolated from both lawyers and the 
public, and they are treated with great deference. All of that can 
be a good thing when it comes to avoiding ethical conflicts and 
respecting the role of the courts, but it makes it even more 
challenging for them to have experiences that give them insights 
into the personal and professional experiences of everyday 
litigants. The judges’ own experiences will predictably affect the 
 
 358.  Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An 
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1156 
(2009). See also Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and 
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 
1761 (2005) (reporting on gender-based panel effects in Title VII appeals). 
 359.  Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having 
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 37 
(2015). 
 360.  Id. at 38. 
 361.  Id. Having daughters had no effect on cases without a gender dimension. 
Id. at 47. 
 362.  Id. at 51. Cf. Patricia Yancey Martin et al., Gender Bias and Feminist 
Consciousness Among Judges and Attorneys: A Standpoint Theory Analysis, 27 
SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 665, 667 (2002) (“[I]ndividuals’ social location 
in the sex-gender system affects their experiences, interpretations, and, 
ultimately, consciousness within and beyond legal contexts.”). 
 363.  Glynn & Sen, supra note 359, at 51. 
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generalizations they bring to inference-drawing, and their 
heuristics can amplify the biases that result. 
E. Cultural Cognition 
Another type of non-merits influence that can affect the ways 
that judges draw inferences is cultural cognition. “Cultural 
cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their 
beliefs about disputed matters of fact . . . to values that define their 
cultural identities.”364 Cultural cognition does not grow solely out 
of an over-use of heuristics.365 “On the contrary, multiple studies 
have found that the individuals most proficient in and most 
disposed to resort to System 2 modes of information processing are 
even more likely to construe information in a manner that evinces 
identity-protective reasoning.”366 Nevertheless, a cluster of System 
1 heuristics form the backbone of cultural cognition.367 
The mechanisms that result in cultural cognition include the 
availability heuristic, biased assimilation of information,368 
credibility (social affinities used to assess credibility and 
trustworthiness of sources of information),369 and affect heuristic 
(identity-protective motivations “to conform one’s beliefs to those 
of like-minded others in order to avoid dissonance and protect 
 
 364.  The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, YALE L. SCH., 
https://perma.cc/V2Q8-K3TR (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 365.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An 
Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 369 (2016) [hereinafter “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?] 
(“Experimental study of identity-protective cognition, however, shows that it is 
not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing.”). 
 366.  Id. 
 367.  Id. 
 368.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and 
Why? An Experimental Study in the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 501, 510 (2010) [hereinafter Who Fears the HPV Vaccine] (“Biased 
assimilation refers to the tendency of individuals selectively to credit and dismiss 
information in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs.”). 
 369.  See id. at 504 (“[C]ultural affinity and cultural difference supply the 
relevant in-group/out-group references that in turn determine whom people see 
as knowledgeable, honest, and unbiased, and thus worthy of being credited in 
debates about risk.”).  
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social standing”).370 In fact, much of the difference in perception 
“coheres with membership in groups integral to personal identity, 
such as race, gender, political party membership, and religious 
affiliation . . . .”371 The net result of these factors can be that 
perception of facts is unconsciously motivated by a person’s 
identity-defining commitments.372 The theory of cultural cognition 
also complements the heuristic model by “showing how one and the 
same heuristic process (whether availability, credibility, loss 
aversion, or affect) can generate different perceptions of risk in 
people with opposing outlooks.”373 
Researchers at Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project 
have done two particularly noteworthy experiments to assess the 
impact of cultural cognition on legally relevant fact finding.374 Both 
studies examined the test subjects’ interpretations of what they 
saw on videotapes.375 One was unedited video that had been the 
subject of a U.S. Supreme Court opinion—one in which Justice 
Scalia’s majority saw no possibility of differing interpretations.376 
 
 370.  Dan Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK 
RES. 147, 149 (2011). See also Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 506 
(identifying biased assimilation and source credibility as the mechanisms behind 
cultural cognition). 
 371.  Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 503. 
 372.  See They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 860 (explaining that even 
citizens committed to liberal neutrality will still divide along cultural lines 
“[b]ecause their perceptions of risk and related facts are unconsciously motivated 
by their defining commitments”). See also Dan M. Kahan, The Politically 
Motivated Reasoning Paradigm, Part 1: What Politically Motivated Reasoning Is 
and How to Measure It, in EMERGING TRENDS IN SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
1, 3–6 (Robert Scott & Stephen Kosslyn eds., 2016) (comparing and contrasting 
politically motivated reasoning with confirmation bias; the goal of the former is 
identity protection). 
 373.  Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, supra note 368, at 503. 
 374.  See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852 (2009) 
[hereinafter Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe] (detailing an experiment); They 
Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 851 (same).  
 375.  Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 838; They Saw 
a Protest, supra note 3, at 851. 
 376.  Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 903. In the case 
that ended up at the Supreme Court as Scott v. Harris, five judges (the trial judge, 
the Eleventh Circuit panel, and Justice Stevens) and eight judges (Justice Scalia 
and the Supreme Court majority) reached opposite conclusions about whether the 
only reasonable inference from the video was that the fleeing driver posed a 
significant danger to police or the public. Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. CIVA 
(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING  1633 
  
The study, however, demonstrated that people with different 
cultural commitments drew very different inferences about danger 
and fault from watching the same videotape of a speeding driver 
fleeing a police car.377 
Another dramatic demonstration of the impact of cultural 
cognition involved a video of protesters in a public place.378 The test 
subjects379 were shown a video of a political demonstration, but 
half believed it to be a protest outside an abortion clinic380 and half 
believed that the demonstrators were protesting the military’s 
“don’t ask/don’t tell” policy outside of a recruitment facility.381 
(Neither was actually true.)382 Whether the subjects thought the 
protesters obstructed and threatened pedestrians “[depended] 
critically on the relationship between the demonstrators’ causes 
and the subjects’ own values. . . . Responses on other items—such 
as whether the protestors ‘screamed in the face’ of 
pedestrians— displayed similar patterns.”383 In other words, if the 
test subjects disagreed with the protesters, they were far more 
likely to infer obstruction, screaming, and intent to threaten; if 
they agreed with the protesters, they were less likely to infer those 
 
3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), rev’d in part, 433 
F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 377.  Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe, supra note 374, at 903.  
 378.  They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 863. 
 379.  The subjects were 202 American adults who were selected randomly from 
a stratified national sample by Polimetrix, Inc. Id. at 869. 
 380.  The abortion clinic version of the video is available here: videoreview12, 
Abortion Clinic 11 22 2010, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), http://youtu.be/k8ru-FE2v_8 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 381.  The military recruiting version of the video is available here: 
videoreview12, Recruit_Center_11192010.m4v, YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2011), 
https://youtu.be/X3PJACpL53k (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 382.  They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 872–73.  
 383.  Id. at 878, 883. Relatively few study participants from any group 
reported seeing spitting or shoving, regardless of their cultural identity. Id. at 
883. The researchers believe this to be evidence that differing values only affect 
contexts in which there is legitimate room for interpretation. Id. It also helps 
show that the participants were not responding in a consciously biased way. Id. 
1634 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019) 
actions.384 And yet all of these groups watched the identical 3.5 
minute video.385 
There is little empirical testing of the effect of cultural 
cognition on judges. One study examined the reactions of a sample 
of judges to social science studies relating to the deterrent effect of 
the death penalty.386 Although the judges applied evidence law 
fairly neutrally in making decisions about admissibility, the 
judges’ pre-existing opinions and political outlooks correlated with 
their decision about whether to afford “dispositive weight” to the 
studies in determining the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.387 
Political science literature is rife with studies showing a 
correlation between judges’ legal decisions and their political 
preferences.388 And there is little question that when a normative 
position is intrinsic to the judicial decision to be made, judges’ 
ideology will be reflected in their decisions. But what about 
decisions in which the preference-salient fact is not legally 
relevant? 
One experimental study by Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and 
others looked at judges and cultural cognition; it concluded that 
non-intrinsic cultural commitments do not influence judges who 
are using their System 2 deliberative reasoning to interpret 
somewhat ambiguous statutory language in order to apply it to a 
set of facts.389 More specifically, the judges and test subjects 
considered two hypothetical cases.390 In one, defendants who would 
be culturally attractive to one group and unappealing to another 
were charged under a statute prohibiting “littering, disposing, or 
depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other debris” on 
 
 384.  Id. at 878. 
 385.  Id. at 872. 
 386.  See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ 
Socio-Political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision 
Making, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999) (theorizing that judges often ignore social 
science research that refutes their sociopolitical beliefs). 
 387.  Id. at 34–35.  
 388.  See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior, 
in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 705, 717–23 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) 
(surveying political science literature on ideology and judicial decision making). 
 389.  “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 410. 
 390.  Id. at 380. 
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the “grounds of a national wildlife preserve.”391 Both defendants 
were leaving empty water jugs that they intended to use to help 
themselves or others.392 In the second hypothetical, the issue was 
whether a statute prohibiting “knowing” disclosure of confidential 
information would cover actions by a police officer that were done 
intentionally but without knowledge that the action was illegal.393 
The reasons for disclosure were the variable, this time polarized 
around attitudes toward abortion.394 
Comparing 253 sitting state court judges to a control group of 
800 members of the public (including lawyers and law students), 
the study found that judges’ legal training “enables judges of 
diverse cultural identities to converge on ‘correct’ answers to 
statutory interpretation questions that trigger polarization along 
identity-protective lines in the public.”395 The same results were 
observed in the lawyers.396 Note, though, that the test cases 
involved situations that suggested clear “correct” answers to a 
legally-trained person. Items placed in the wildlife reserve to be 
useful are unlikely to be “garbage, refuse, junk, or debris.”397 Even 
more so, the oft-invoked principle that “ignorance of the law is no 
excuse” may have made it seem quite obvious to lawyers that an 
intentional act was “knowing.”398 This result—the ability of a clear 
legal principle to override heuristic biases—is consistent with 
Professor Girvan’s study (on law students) showing that legal rules 
can override heuristic biases, while standards and balancing tests 
do not.399 It would be interesting to see a study in which the 
interpretation-application task was in a context which would seem 
 
 391.  Id. 
 392.  Id.  
 393.  Id. at 382. 
 394.  Id. 
 395.  See James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV. 
207, 232 (2019) (describing the study by Kahan). 
 396. “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 411. 
 397.  Id. at 380–82.  
 398.  Id. at 382–84. 
   399. See supra note 312 and accompanying text (describing the results of 
Girvan’s study). On the other hand, this study contrasts interestingly with the 
RGW study of the impact of affect. See Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 
877–88 (finding that judges’ interpretation of an ambiguous statute varied with 
the sympathy one would feel with the defendant). 
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more indeterminate even to legally trained test subjects. Would 
the judges’ cultural identities exert more influence under those 
conditions? 
 This study also does not purport to address the question of 
whether judges’ cultural cognition affects their decisions about 
disputed facts, including inferences.400 The RGW group, in writing 
about a study of judges’ susceptibility to the affect heuristic, 
predicted that the impact on fact finding might be even stronger 
than that on legal analysis: “We cannot say for sure, of course, but 
we believe that emotion exerts even greater influence on fact 
finding. Many believe that facts are more uncertain than law, and 
the greater the indeterminacy the greater the opportunity for 
extrinsic influences, such as affect, to intrude.”401 
F. Judicial Demographics 
Heuristics are mental processes that operate to foreground 
information, but they will bring forward different information for 
different people, because those people have different information 
and experiences (availability), and different attitudes 
(confirmation and affect heuristics, implicit biases, and cultural 
identities). These differences will lead to different generalizations 
and different inferences. Across the federal judiciary, the collective 
impact of heuristics would be somewhat less worrying if the 
judiciary were well-balanced in terms of professional and life 
experiences and cultural commitments. But is this the case? 
The Congressional Research Service did a study of the 
demographics of the federal district and circuit courts as of June 
2017.402 Focusing on the district courts, where the bulk of the 
 
 400.   See “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”?, supra note 365, at 410 (noting the 
study’s scope).  
 401.  Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 904.  
 402. BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS (2017). While the 
study also contained information about sitting judges’ job positions immediately 
prior to being appointed to their current federal judicial position, its categories 
are too broad to be very informative (e.g. “private practice”), and it does not 
contain information about all of the judge’s pre-bench professional work. The 
percentage of judges coming to the district bench directly from private practice 
has decreased over time. See Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of U.S. 
District Judges: Likely Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 141 
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pretrial inferences are made, the data shows a group that is 
heavily white, male, and older. Of the 570 active district judges at 
that time, only 194 (34%) were women.403 In terms of race, 406 
(71%) were white, 81 (14%) were African American, 58 (10%) were 
Hispanic, 16 (3%) were Asian American, 1 (.2%) was American 
Indian, and 8 (1.4%) were multiracial.404 Of the ten judicial 
districts with the highest percentage of the population that is 
African American, four had no currently serving African American 
judges (the Southern and Middle Districts of Alabama, Southern 
District of Georgia, and Western District of Louisiana).405 
It is likely that the percentage of white and male judges has 
increased somewhat under President Trump. As of August 5, 2019, 
of his ninety-nine appointees to the federal district courts, he 
appointed sixty-four (64.6%) white male and nineteen (19.2%) 
white female district court judges (so 83.8% of his appointees are 
white).406 He appointed fourteen (14.1%) district court judges of 
either sex (three female, eleven male) who are non-white.407 
Some research indicates that the presence of some 
nontraditional judges may help to broaden the perspective of other 
 
(2010) (showing that sixty-seven percent of President Eisenhower’s appointees to 
the U.S. district bench came from private practice, while only thirty-four percent 
of President George W. Bush’s appointees did so). 
 403.  MCMILLION, supra note 402, at 15. 
 404.  Id. at 17. 
 405.  Id. When gender and race are combined, the data show that as of June 
2017, 49.3% of federal district judges were white men, 21.9% were white women, 
8.1% were African American men, 6.1% were African American women, 6.5% were 
Hispanic men, 3.7% were Hispanic women, 1.6% were Asian American men, and 
1.2% were Asian American women. Id. at 19–20. The report noted that all 
categories other than white men are considered to be “nontraditional” and that 
56.1% of the active nontraditional district judges had been appointed by President 
Obama. Id. at 21–22. Statistics on age show that the federal district judges skew 
older. In June of 2017, the average age of a U.S. District Judge was 60.8 years 
(the median was 61.3). Id. at 23. The largest group (269 judges—or 47.2%) are 
between the ages of 60 and 69. Id. An additional fifty-three judges (9.3%) are 
seventy or older, making 56.5% of all federal district judges over sixty years of 
age. Id.  
 406.  Calculations were made using the search tool Biographical Directory of 
Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
https://perma.cc/3GBP-E2SL (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 407.  Id. 
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judges. One type of study focuses on the courts of appeal and looks 
at “panel effects,” while others examine the possibility that a 
critical mass of nontraditional judges can make a difference.408 In 
that regard, the federal district courts are a mixed bag. In June of 
2017, there was at least one active female district judge in eighty 
of ninety-one district courts, but there were no women serving on 
eleven district courts.409 Thirty-seven district courts had only one 
active female judge.410 Lack of racial minorities was even more 
dramatic. In June of 2017, “there were African American judges 
serving on 44, or 48%, of the nation’s 91 U.S. district courts; 
Hispanic judges serving on 24 (26%) of the courts; and Asian 
American judges serving on 12 (13%) of the courts.”411 
Twenty-three of the district courts that did have an African 
American judge had only one.412 Only seven courts have at least 
one active district judge from all three of the groups counted (“i.e., 
 
 408.  See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, 
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 406 
(2010) (“For males at relatively average levels of ideology, the likelihood of a 
liberal, pro-plaintiff vote increases by almost 85% when sitting with a female 
judge.”); Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’ 
Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why it Matters, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 195, 202 (2017) (“[E]vidence indicates that when groups are comprised of 
more diverse members, those members learn from each other and provide checks 
on the correctness of shared information, ultimately leading to more accurate 
decisionmaking.”); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, 
Gender, Critical Mass, and Judicial Decision Making, 32 L. & POL’Y 260, 265 
(2010) (“Prior research suggests that the mere presence of decision makers from 
an underrepresented group in the overall decision-making environment may be 
enough to have a discernable effect on the output of that environment, so long as 
a certain ‘critical mass’ is reached.”); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, 
Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation 
Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 300 (2004) (arguing that 
an institutional norm of unanimity encourages deliberation, which in turn may 
allow numerical minorities on panels to influence case outcomes). But cf. 
Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1227 (describing a study in which 
white judges, in a jurisdiction consisting of roughly half white and half black 
judges, still showed strong implicit biases, and observing that “[e]xposure to a 
group of esteemed black colleagues apparently is not enough to counteract the 
societal influences that lead to implicit biases”). 
 409.  MCMILLION, supra note 402, at 15. 
 410.  Id. at 16. 
 411.  Id. at 17. 
 412. Id.  
(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING  1639 
  
there was at least one active African American, Hispanic, and 
Asian American judge serving on the court”).413 
From an income perspective, federal district judges are, by 
virtue of their salaries alone, in a place that makes them different 
from many litigants. For 2017, the annual salary of federal district 
judges was $205,100.414 The U.S. Census Bureau puts the 2017 
median household income at $61,372, so judges are well above the 
median.415 In fact, a recent Economic Policy Institute study shows 
that the district judge salary is comfortably in the average salary 
of the top ten percent of earners for 2017.416 
Taking all of this demographic information together, it seems 
possible that the experience of the federal district judges as a group 
may be skewed toward the experiences of the affluent, white, male 
majority.417 While studies do not seem to show across-the-board 
differences between the decisions of male and female judges, or 
between white judges and judges of color, there is evidence of race 
and gender differences when race or gender is a salient issue in the 
case.418 Further studies, examining more fine-tuned heuristics, 
implicit biases, and cultural commitments may find additional 
effects. In any case, conscious efforts to appoint a body of trial-level 
judges who are diverse across a number of measures would help to 
avoid overall tipping of inferences and even substantive law in 
favor of the experiences of a homogeneous group.419 
 
 413.  Id. 
 414.  Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 
https://perma.cc/URM3-X5TN (last visited Sept. 5, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 415.  Jonathan L. Rothbaum, U.S. Census Bureau, Redesigned Questions May 
Contribute to Increase, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/TE9H-46NW (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 416.  Lawrence Mishel & Julia Wolfe, Top 1% Reaches Highest Wages  
Ever—Up 157% Since 1979, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 18, 2018, 11:49 AM), 
https://perma.cc/28ZC-UZMJ (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (see Table 1) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 417.  See supra notes 402–416 and accompanying text (noting that most judges 
in the U.S. are white males).  
 418.  See supra notes 354–358 and accompanying text (describing the effect of 
various biases on case outcomes). 
 419.  For example, it can be argued that the heuristics and biases of the 
dominant culture have caused the substantive law of employment discrimination 
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G. Summary 
Where does all this get us? With respect to judges as a group: 
• During the pretrial period, they make countless 
decisions that are based on the evaluation and drawing 
of inferences.420 
• Those inferences can differ significantly from judge to 
judge.421 
• Those differences often turn on differences in the judges’ 
“experience and common sense” and the generalizations 
that those factors produce.422 
• That “experience and common sense” expresses itself 
through the powerful operation of mental 
shortcuts— heuristics and biases—that work 
automatically and at an unconscious level in a way that 
can influence even deliberate decision making.423 
• At times, the heuristics pave the way for implicit biases 
and culturally motivated cognition to affect judicial 
decisions, even in judges who are consciously committed 
to an unbiased and impartial judicial system.424 
• The heuristics and biases can be particularly hard to 
tame, because of a cluster of person-centered heuristics 
that falsely lead people (including judges) to believe 
that they are more correct, their opinions more 
universally held, and their ability to avoid biases more 
exceptional than is in fact the case.425 
• Judges’ legal and professional training does not 
overcome the powerful influence of the unconscious 
processes in most cases that have been studied.426  
 
to be shaped in a way that turns certain inferences (or rejection of inferences) into 
legal presumptions. See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109,  
118–21 (2012) (noting presumptions regarding “stray remarks,” “honest beliefs,” 
and the requirements for comparators). 
 420.  See supra Part III.  
 421.  See supra Part III. 
 422.  See supra Part IV. 
 423.  See supra Part V.A.  
 424. See supra Part V.D–E. 
 425. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text. 
 426.  See supra Part V.B. 
(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING  1641 
  
• In situations involving legal analysis (as opposed to 
fact-finding), judges have sometimes shown themselves 
able to overcome the influence of hindsight bias and 
cultural cognition to apply a clear, applicable rule, but 
there are, as of yet, no studies with comparable results 
for fact-finding.427 
• In situations where the danger of racial bias is explicit, 
motivated judges may be able to consciously offset the 
bias when applying legal standards to a fact pattern.428 
However, when racial issues are suggested 
unconsciously, implicit associations influence the 
judge.429 
• The demographics of the federal judiciary support a 
concern that the collective implementation of 
“experience and common sense” will skew both 
individual cases and the development of the law 
generally in the direction of the predominant judicial 
background, to the detriment of a wider array of 
experiences.430 
More studies will be needed for a richer understanding of 
judicial cognition. But there is enough information already to give 
reasons for concern, especially given the pervasive nature of 
judicial fact inferences. Part VI will consider what systemic 
changes might help the inference process operate in a more reliable 
way. 
VI. Improving the System 
Inferences are certainly not going away. But there are 
measures that the federal courts could take to lessen the impact of 
problematic heuristics on the pretrial process. First, sustained 
training on heuristics, biases, and ways to combat them might 
have some effect. Second, practices that activate deliberative 
 
 427.  See supra Part V.E. 
 428.  See supra Part V.E. 
 429.  But see Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 251, at 1246–48 (finding 
that race did not play a significant role in a study where bankruptcy judges were 
asked to discharge an award to a hypothetical debtor with either an African 
American- or a white-sounding name).  
 430.  See supra Part V.F. 
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thinking and encourage consideration of competing inferences can 
be institutionalized. Third, certain rules of procedure (and their 
interpretations) should be changed in ways that 1) enrich the 
factual record on which the judges rule; and 2) discourage methods 
of analysis that allow the judge to compare inferences. 
A. Judicial Education 
Court systems have already begun to provide judges with 
education about the existence of heuristics and techniques to help 
deal with them, particularly in the context of implicit bias. The 
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) has recently developed a set of 
judicial competencies, defined as “an area of proficiency essential 
for successful performance in a job.”431 The knowledge 
competencies include a broad array of types of social cognition.432 
The competencies guide the judicial education curriculum, and the 
FJC has over the last several years offered numerous sessions on 
heuristics and implicit bias, including in new judge orientation, 
programs about “the art of judging” generally, and in 
substantive-law-specific programming.433 The FJC website hosts 
high-quality information on the nature of implicit bias and ways to 
reduce its impact.434 Similarly, the National Center for State 
Courts (NCSC) did a three-state pilot project to teach judges and 
court staff about implicit bias, and now has helpful resources on its 
website.435 Further, the American Judges Association’s project, 
 
 431.  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COMPETENCIES FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES v 
(June 2018).  
 432.  The list includes cultural practices and norms inside and outside of the 
United States; social customs of groups besides one’s own; differences in 
communication styles among cultures; impact of implicit bias; impact of 
socio-economic status on personal decision making; different norms for 
interacting with authority figures; and experiences specific to race, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Id. at 8. 
 433.  Telephone Interviews with Judge Jeremy Fogel, then-Director, Federal 
Judicial Center; educator Denise Neary, Senior Judicial Education Attorney, 
Federal Judicial Center; and researchers Jason Cantone, Senior Research 
Associate, and Beth Wiggins, Senior Researcher and Project Director, Federal 
Judicial Center (Sept.–Oct. 2018).  
 434.  Jason A. Cantone (curator), Federal and State Court Cooperation: 
Reducing Bias, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://perma.cc/ZLN3-5XSZ (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 435.  See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1175 (describing pilot project); Gender 
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Making Better Judges, has resulted in a white paper that 
recognizes the influence of heuristics and makes suggestions for 
improvement.436 
Although it is important that the courts are doing this kind of 
education, there is reason to doubt that education alone can have 
a decisive impact, particularly if it is delivered in short, episodic 
programs. The extensive literature on de-biasing training is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but two points are important to 
note here.  
First, some types of training appear to be more effective than 
others in the short run, and they are more effective at raising 
awareness than at spurring the adoption of behavioral 
countermeasures. For example, one 2014 study tested seventeen 
methods for reducing implicit bias and found only eight to be 
effective at reducing implicit preferences for whites as compared to 
blacks.437 Another meta-study found that the positive effects were 
“greater when training was complemented by other diversity 
initiatives, targeted to both awareness and skills development, and 
conducted over a significant period of time.”438 It is quite clear that 
merely telling judges to “try harder” or “be unbiased” will not be 
effective.439 
 
and Racial Fairness Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
https://perma.cc/832N-GLPB (last updated Feb. 27, 2019) (last visited Sept. 5, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Helping Courts 
Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (2012), 
https://perma.cc/QVH4-7NRX (last visited Sept. 5, 2019) (providing tools to 
combat implicit bias) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 436.  Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Minding the Court: 
Enhancing the Decision-Making Process, 49 CT. REV.: J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 76 
(2013). 
 437.  Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences I: A 
Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
GEN. 1765, 1766 (2014). 
 438.  Katerina Bezrukova et al., A Meta-Analytical Integration of Over 40 
Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation, 142 PSYCH. BULL. 1227, 1227 
(2016). 
 439.  See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in 
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 543 (2004) (asserting that research 
on attempts to prevent bias and errors in judgment making indicates that direct 
approaches, such as simply informing participants of potential bias, are 
“generally unsuccessful”). 
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Thinking more specifically about judicial education, it may be 
that the most effective types of training in using deliberative 
rather than intuitive processes might be a combination of 
informational programs about heuristics (so that judges recognize 
that it is a “thing”) coupled with suggested skills that promote 
conscious thought.440 These could include techniques like “consider 
the opposite” or “consider alternatives,”441 structured methods of 
calling mental attention to perspectives and experiences other 
than the judge’s own instinctive ones.442 Education designed to 
increase motivation to minimize the impact of unconscious biases 
might also enhance the impact of the programs.443 This might 
include “periodic public reaffirmation of key professional norms,” 
particularly in avoiding bias.444 More generally, “motivated 
self-regulation” can result from awareness of bias that is 
inconsistent with a judge’s conscious commitments to fairness and 
accuracy.445 One study found: 
The motivated self-regulation strategy operates by making 
people aware of their biased responses that stand in conflict 
 
 440.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 4; Kang et al., supra note 
12, at 1174 (suggesting that teaching people about nonconscious thought 
processes can lead them to be more skeptical about their own objectivity). 
 441.  See Jackie M. Poos et al., Battling Bias: Effects of Training and Training 
Context, 111 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 101, 109 (2017); Heart Versus Head, supra note 
229, at 910; Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics 
Problem in Feminist Legal Theory, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 436–37 (2006); 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2523–24 (2004) (“Psychologists have repeatedly found that considering the 
opposite reduces overconfidence, biased information assimilation, biased 
hypothesis testing, and excessive perseverance of beliefs. This technique is 
effective because it tears people away from anchors favorable to their own 
positions and makes contrary anchors more accessible and salient.”). 
 442.  See Simon, supra note 16, at 139 (suggesting techniques that “interfere 
in the normal process of making the decision and impede the indiscriminate 
adoption of one entire mental model”). 
 443.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Implicit Bias in Judicial 
Decision Making: How it Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in 
ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 87, 116 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017) 
[hereinafter Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making] (stating that providing 
judges with reminders of their professional obligations may keep judges more 
conscious in preventing biased decision making). 
 444.  Id. 
 445. See Mason D. Burns et al., Training Away Bias: The Differential Effects 
of Counterstereotype Training and Self-Regulation on Stereotype Activation and 
Application, 73 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 108 (2017). 
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with their personal beliefs. The resulting feelings of guilt and 
disappointment with the self then lead to a cascade of 
consequences that help people monitor for and regulate 
potentially biased responses in the future.446 
Judicial motivation would likely be essential to successful 
education.447 “For any change to take place, it is imperative that 
judges be motivated to overcome their automatic processes.”448 
Second, there is almost no evidence that anti-bias training has 
an effect in the long run. The same researchers who had found 
eight out of seventeen of the tested interventions against implicit 
bias to be effective did two more studies and reached a depressing 
conclusion: “In 2 studies with a total of 6,321 participants, all 9 
interventions immediately reduced implicit preferences. However, 
none were effective after a delay of several hours to several 
days.”449 On a more positive note, one study did show small effects 
of training two years later.450 
Education about the impact of nonconscious thought 
processes, then, might be of some help, especially if done as part of 
overall institutional systems and repeated over time.451 It will be 
important for judicial education officials to attempt to assess the 
effectiveness of the programs they provide, both to identify the 
most promising techniques and to try to gauge the judiciary’s level 
of achievement of the desired competencies.452 This type of 
assessment is difficult because self-reports about unconscious 
processes are apt to be unreliable (“No, I am not influenced by 
 
 446.  Id. 
 447.  Simon, supra note 16, at 140. 
 448.  Id.  
 449.  Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences II: Intervention 
Effectiveness Across Time, 145 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1001, 1002 
(2016); see also Bezrukova, supra note 438, at 1242 (“Comparing the immediate 
versus long-term effects of diversity training, we found that diversity training 
effects on reactions and attitudinal/affective learning decayed over time.”). 
 450.  Patrick Forscher et al., Breaking the Prejudice Habit: Mechanisms, 
Timecourse, and Longevity, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 146 (2017) 
(finding that participants were more likely to notice bias in themselves and 
confront bias in other two years after habit-breaking intervention training). 
 451.  See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1174 (noting characteristics of effective 
education).  
 452.  Lai et al., supra note 449, at 1002. 
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unconscious cognition.”).453 Education, though, will not provide the 
magic bullet, and so further structural changes will be important. 
B. Deliberation-Prompting Practices 
The types of educational programs described above are 
primarily ways to equip judges to move from the automatic System 
1 responses into deliberate System 2 thinking.454 In addition to 
training designed to raise awareness of the need to do so and some 
techniques for activating diverse perspectives, there are ways to 
create institutional requirements that foster more effortful 
thought. They would also have the benefit of making decisions 
more transparent and demonstrating that even arguments that 
the court has not adopted have been heard. Some techniques 
operate at the individual-judge level, while others would require 
the creation of systemic structures.  
Scholars have made a number of suggestions about practices 
that can prompt judges to make themselves aware of the impact of 
their own unconscious processes.455 A jurisdiction might even 
mandate or incentivize use of some of these behaviors, at least in 
certain types of cases. Some—such as “consider the  
opposite”—have been discussed above as techniques to help make 
the judge aware of the contestability of her own intuitions.456 A 
related technique is referred to as “perspective-taking.”457 Here the 
judge would adopt the viewpoint of other individuals and examine 
the scenario through their life experiences.458 The use of decision 
protocols such as checklists and scripts may also encourage 
 
 453.  See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1176–77 (suggesting that mandatory 
disclosure of personal evaluations may “counter the benefits of increased 
self-knowledge”).  
 454.  See supra Part V.A (defining System 1 and System 2 cognition). 
 455.  See generally Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443; 
Kang et al., supra note 12; Heart Versus Head, supra note 229. 
 456.  See supra note 441 and accompanying text (suggesting ways to combat 
internal biases in judicial decision-making). 
 457.  Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 113. 
 458.  Id. Note, however, that this type of reasoning runs the risk of using 
stereotypes in making assumptions about what a person with a particular 
identity would be thinking. Id. 
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deliberation.459 The checklists could even require the judge to 
indicate that he or she had used a deliberative technique such as 
“consider the opposite” in order to check for the potential impact of 
heuristics.460 These physical reminders of an intention to 
counteract the impact of heuristics can help the judge form a new 
habit of doing so.461 
Retrospective self-analysis could also be helpful. Judges could 
record decisional data and periodically review it to look for 
patterns.462 As Professor Kang and his co-authors noted, “Judges 
need to count.”463 A failure to live up to one’s own expectations can 
provide a judge with motivation to continue to try to consider 
others’ experiences and to think hard about the universality of 
“common sense.” Some judges have recently expressed interest in 
seeing a statistical analysis of their own decisions to help monitor 
their own performances, indicating that such data might find a 
receptive audience. 464 
When a decision might be influenced by emotion or affect, the 
judge should be encouraged to engage with that emotion rather 
than to try to suppress it.465 “Although some judges profess to 
 
 459.  Id. at 119; NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 7. See also Heart 
Versus Head, supra note 229, at 910 (asserting that decision protocols facilitate 
deliberations by encouraging judges to analyze, share, and explain the feelings 
leading to a decision). Although checklists can help, they are also easily 
circumvented through unthoughtful, rote compliance if a judge is not actually 
motivated to locate and reconsider the impact of heuristics and biases. Research 
showing that the application of clear rules can overcome heuristic biases might 
argue in favor of replacing flexible legal standards with more fixed rules, but 
attempting to do so could be difficult and, worse, substantively undesirable. 
 460.  See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 119 
(suggesting that multifactor tests alone are not enough to eliminate implicit bias 
because judges may utilize heuristics in a way that would devalue the test). 
 461.  See id. (suggesting that scripts and checklists reduce the likelihood a 
judge will overly rely on intuition). 
 462.  See id. at 108–09 (suggesting that judges could perform self-audits by 
recording data regarding their discretionary decisions and evaluating this 
information over time). 
 463.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1178. 
 464.  See Judge Emily Miskel (@emilymiskel), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 8:22 
PM), https://perma.cc/Y8B7-5PB2 (voicing support for statistical data); Chief 
Justice Bridget Mary McCormick (@BridgetMaryMc), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 8:49 
PM), https://perma.cc/U9E2-79NN (same).  
 465.  Heart Versus Head, supra note 229, at 910. 
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follow suppression strategies, there is no evidence that such 
strategies are effective. In general, trying not to think about 
something not only is ineffective but may even have an ironic 
rebound effect.”466 Similarly, judges should avoid making difficult 
decisions when tired, stressed, distracted, or pressured.467 
The capstone of a more slow and conscious process would be 
the practice of writing opinions that go into some detail about the 
reasons for the decision.468 Jurisdictions wanting to 
institutionalize this practice could, through statute or procedure 
rules, require opinion writing.469 Rethinking the way in which 
opinions are written could also promote deeper thought. 
Traditionally, once a judge has reached a conclusion, opinions tend 
to be written in a way that marshals every argument in support of 
that conclusion and downplays or ignores opposing arguments.470 
Instead, opinions could recognize strong counterarguments that 
some scholars argue can help judges avoid “decisions based on 
their own culturally biased motivations.”471 This could both 
 
   466.  Id. See also Terry A. Moroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial 
Behavior, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1485, 1505, 1522, 1524 (2011) (recommending 
emotional introspection and disclosure). 
 467.  NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., supra note 435, at 9. In one of the most 
disturbing studies on the impact of judges’ mental state on decisions, economists 
from Louisiana State University found that juvenile court judges who were LSU 
graduates handed down more severe sentences to black defendants during the 
week following an unexpected football loss. See generally Ozkan Eren & Naci 
Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles, 10 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 
171 (2018). 
 468.  See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 117– 18 
(suggesting judges should be required to write opinions more often in order to 
encourage deliberation). 
 469.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(6) (“An order imposing a sanction must 
describe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.”); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 65(b)(2) (“Every temporary restraining order issued without notice 
must . . . describe the injury and state why it is irreparable.”). 
 470.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 43–44; Simon, supra note 16, at 137. 
 471.  Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing 
Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 392 (2012). See also Kang et al., supra note 
12, at 43–44; They Saw a Protest, supra note 3, at 896 (suggesting that jurors and 
appellate panels might adopt a practice of “deliberate depolarization” in which a 
person expressing his or her own opinion would also express the strongest 
counterargument). This is easier said than done, however. The usual process of 
analyzing complex materials involves the judge, whose brain seeks coherence, 
unconsciously changing the evaluation of prior positions, and this process 
operates at an unconscious level. Simon, supra note 16, at 19–20. 
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highlight the need to consider those counterarguments and make 
the process and end result of the decision clearer both to the 
litigants and to members of the public who are interested in the 
dispute. 
Deliberation is also more likely when the judge has adequate 
time to consider his or her decision.472 In addition to the usual 
admonitions about taking time to reflect and avoiding making 
decisions when stressed or tired, one statutory reform could be 
useful here. A recent study demonstrated that the so-called “Six 
Month List,” a law mandating the disclosure twice a year of each 
judge’s pending cases and motions may actually have an effect on 
case outcomes.473 The forced deadlines (to avoid public shaming 
about perceived delay in disposing of cases) may in fact change the 
way judges rule.474 
Other potential interventions create systems that allow judges 
to interact in ways that could help self-assess their decisions, look 
for patterns, and provide each other with peer feedback. A number 
of systems are possible, including collegial peer review committees 
that meet periodically to talk about their decisions and associated 
issues.475 Another alternative would be anonymous peer review, 
including concrete suggestions about how to improve 
performance.476 
 
 472.  See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 111– 12 
(suggesting that mindfulness meditation, which entails slowing down an 
individual’s mental processes, may reduce implicit bias). 
 473.  Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, AGAINST 
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: EVIDENCE FROM THE SIX MONTH LIST (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/DMF6-HUNU (PDF) [hereinafter Evidence from the Six Month 
List] (suggesting a law requiring judges to participate in biannual disclosures). 
 474.  Id. 
 475.  Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 118; 
Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1230 (proposing an auditing program 
to evaluate judges’ decisions in the criminal justice system). For example, a small 
group of judges could meet periodically to talk about their rulings on summary 
judgment motions and the reasons for them. Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision 
Making, supra note 443, at 109. 
 476.  Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 109. As the 
authors note, it seems unlikely that judges would find this option attractive. Id. 
at 110 (noting judges may be reluctant to utilizing auditing procedures, because 
it could expose them to unfair criticism). A related example, also with political 
drawbacks, would be to identify certain types of cases in which the unconscious 
influence of heuristics could be particularly troubling, and handle appeals from 
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Systemic practices designed to incentivize or require judges to 
think about alternatives before reaching conclusions, to force 
themselves to go through each step of the analysis, and to 
articulate reasons for their decisions can be helpful in combatting 
misleading heuristics and in increasing transparency for the 
parties and the public.477 All of this also could help to reduce a bias 
blind spot held by the judges when faced with heuristics and 
training.478 But like training, they can do only so much. Our brains 
are programmed to minimize effortful thinking, and our 
socialization encourages us to reach decisions that are consistent 
with our political identities.479 Further changes are therefore 
necessary in order to enhance judicial fact-finding and decrease the 
instances in which the inferences of a single judge will terminate 
a case. 
C. Procedure Rules 
Procedural standards can do something that education and 
awareness cannot: they can structure rules so as to foster the 
development of a fuller factual record, leaving fewer gaps to be 
filled by inferences and informing those inferences with a richer 
and more nuanced set of facts. They can also make choices that 
give great weight to the right to trial by jury and minimize the 
ability of a single judge’s inferences to end litigation. 
1. Pleadings: Stop Comparing Inferences 
In theory, judges are not finding facts when ruling on motions 
to dismiss on pleadings.480 During the last few decades, however, 
 
those orders differently, assigning a de novo standard of review and a diverse 
panel of judges. Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 253, at 1231. 
 477.  See Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making, supra note 443, at 117– 18 
(suggesting a systematic requirement for judges to write opinions more 
frequently). 
 478.  See id. at 117 (proposing that “the discipline of opinion writing might 
enable well-meaning judges to overcome their intuitive, impressionistic 
reactions”). 
 479.  Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1177. 
 480.  See Elizabeth Thornburg, Law, Facts, and Power, 114 PENN STATIM 1, 2 
(2009) (discussing the policy-based nature of the law/fact distinction). Through a 
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changes in the application of procedure rules have led to a practice 
in which judges allow cases to move forward toward discovery only 
if they find the nonmovant’s inferences to be at least as credible as 
the alternatives.481 That makes the judge’s assessment of 
inferences overly determinative, especially when one realizes that 
those inferences are not some kind of neutral mathematical 
calculation.482 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,483 
judges ruling on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim have 
been tasked with taking only “facts” as true and accepting 
inferences only if they are “plausible.”484 Although the opinion 
disclaims a requirement that the inference must be “probable,” it 
rejects “mere possibility.”485 In fact, the Court has refused to find 
an inference to be plausible if it believes another one to be more 
likely.486 Iqbal characterizes the result in Twombly487 as a decision 
that the phone companies’ parallel conduct was “more likely 
explained by” an inference of free market behavior than illegal 
agreements.488 Similarly, the Iqbal plaintiffs’ inferences of 
discriminatory conduct were found comparatively implausible: 
“given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish 
this purpose.”489 
Comparing inferences in this way puts far too much weight on 
the judge’s own inference choices, colored by the judge’s experience 
and attitudes.490 The question should not be whether the pleaded 
 
kind of definitional sleight-of-hand, the judge’s decision that an inference cannot 
be supported is defined as a question of “law.” Id. 
 481.  Id. 
 482. See id. at 9–11 (noting that the law-fact distinction created in Iqbal 
increases the power of judges). 
 483.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 484.  Id. at 678. 
 485.  Id. at 679. 
 486.  Id. at 681. 
 487.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 488.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. 
 489.  Id. at 681. 
 490.  See Thornburg, supra note 480, at 10 (asserting that the law-fact 
distinction in Iqbal privileges appellate court judges’ impressions over trial 
judges’ decisions).  
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inference is at least as probable (in the opinion of the judge) as 
others; it should be whether it is possible.491 The risk of heuristic 
bias is so unavoidable under current law that any analysis of 
pleading sufficiency that turns on comparing inferences must be 
abandoned.492 We cannot know, for example, whether experiences 
and heuristics contributed to the different inferences of the white 
Alabama trial judge and black Florida appellate judge in Lewis v. 
Bentley, but a rule structured so that they were not called upon to 
compare the plausibility of racial discrimination and state-level 
control would decrease this concern.493 
Since Rule 8(a) itself does not mandate comparisons as part of 
the Iqbal-mandated plausibility analysis, this change in analytical 
method could be made without a rule amendment.494 Judicial 
practices, though, would need to change; judges should not dismiss 
cases because they believe an inference contrary to the plaintiff’s 
is more probable.495 
As to types of cases in which slanted heuristics are 
particularly likely, a solution would need to come from outside the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trans-substantive nature of 
the rules precludes changes that single out specific substantive 
areas for different treatment. Outside of the rules, though, changes 
in substantive law that establish certain presumptions might help 
highlight issues in which inferences are particularly likely to be 
 
 491.  See id. at 12 (pointing out that judges may come to different conclusions 
on the same record based on the evidence they consider and the inferences they 
draw from said evidence). 
 492.  See id. at 4 (noting the great risk of bias). 
 493.  Compare Lewis v. Bentley, No. 2:16-CV-690-RDP, 2017 WL 432464, at 
*11 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegation” 
that the Minimum Wage Act was racially discriminatory “fails to nudge 
their . . . equal protection claims across the line from conceivable to plausible”), 
with Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 896 F.3d 1282, 1294–97 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding 
that the plaintiffs stated a claim sufficient to infer that the Minimum Wage Act 
had both the purpose and effect of “depriving Birmingham’s black citizens equal 
economic opportunities on the basis of race” in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 494.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (stating pleading rules for a “claim for relief”).  
 495.  See Thornburg, supra note 480, at 59 (asserting that the standard 
promulgated in Iqbal defines “plausible” as excluding “mere possibility” whereas 
in practice the Court has only found plausibility when it finds another inference 
is not more likely).  
(UN)CONSCIOUS JUDGING  1653 
  
unreliable because of the limits of generalizations or social 
stereotypes.496 
2. Summary Judgment: Consider Only Inferences in Favor of 
Nonmovant 
The analysis in summary judgment cases works similarly to a 
motion to dismiss, but no change in the law would be necessary. 
Proper application of existing legal standards does not allow the 
judge to choose among reasonable inferences.497 Rule 56 instructs 
judges to grant summary judgment only if there is no “genuine 
dispute as to any material fact” and the “movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”498 The temptation to compare 
inferences comes from adjectives that modify the word “inference.” 
In both summary judgment and directed verdict contexts, judges 
are told to let the case continue if the nonmovant’s inference is 
reasonable.499  
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and 
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of 
the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 
are to be drawn in his favor.500 
The problem with these descriptions lies not in the 
requirement of reasonableness, but in some courts’ practices of 1) 
considering even impeached evidence in favor of the movant; 2) 
considering inferences in favor of the movant; and 3) judging 
 
 496.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2019) (arguing in favor of a presumption of employment 
discrimination that would satisfy Iqbal’s plausibility requirement). 
 497.  See Clermont, supra note 5, at 4 (stating judgment as a matter of law 
focuses on “reasonable possibility” as opposed to a comparison of “infinite 
alternatives”). 
 498.  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 499.  See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) (addressing directed 
verdict); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) 
(addressing judgment as a matter of law). 
 500.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (emphasis 
added).  
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reasonableness comparatively, so that an inference only counts as 
reasonable if, in the judge’s view, it is superior to others. Jurors, 
the ultimate fact finders, are the ones entrusted to compare beliefs 
in different possibilities.501 That is not the job of a judge ruling on 
a motion that will end the case before it goes to the jury. 
Greater emphasis on what may and may not be considered 
would help clarify the mental process that a judge ruling on a 
summary judgment motion should use. The judge needs to be 
acutely aware that she should consider all evidence in favor of the 
nonmovant and only evidence in favor of the movant that has not 
been contradicted or impeached.502 (If evidence has been 
contradicted or impeached, the judge would be making a credibility 
decision, and that is not proper in the summary judgment 
context.)503 Note also that, in the case of movants’ evidence, this is 
limited to testimony from “disinterested witnesses.”504 
In addition to the limits on what evidence to consider, proper 
application of Rule 56 requires that the judge consider only the 
inference in support of the nonmovant without comparing it to 
alternatives.505 If that inference is reasonable, considered in 
isolation, then the case should continue to jury trial.506 
Unfortunately, some cases have considered pro-movant inferences 
in deciding that the nonmovant’s inference could not be found by a 
reasonable jury. For example, in the Chadwick case discussed in 
Part IV, the trial judge granted summary judgment because he 
rejected as a matter of law an inference that denying the plaintiff 
a promotion was motivated by her status as a woman with young 
children; to him, the inference that the same decision would have 
been made about a man with young children had not been 
sufficiently ruled out.  
 
 501.  See Clermont, supra note 5, at 22 (noting the role of jurors). 
 502.  Wilkerson, 336 U.S. at 57 (1949) (directed verdict); Reeves, 530 U.S. at 
151 (2000). Although Reeves is about post-trial motions, the opinion notes that 
the standard to be applied should be the same for summary judgment. Id. at 150. 
 503.  See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151 (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of 
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 
functions, not those of a judge.”). 
 504.  Id. 
 505.  Id. at 150–51. 
 506.  Id. at 151. 
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Other cases, especially those involving state of mind, reflect 
the same kind of failure to analyze the record in light of the 
limitations on summary judgment. One such case is Jennings v. 
University of North Carolina,507 in which the trial judge, original 
majority opinion, and dissenting opinion on en banc review 
considered (and preferred) inferences in favor of the movant.508 The 
plaintiff had been a member of the University of North Carolina 
(UNC) women’s soccer team, and she alleged that the coach 
“persistently and openly pried into and discussed the sex lives of 
his players and made sexually charged comments, thereby creating 
a hostile environment in the women’s soccer program.”509 The 
Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion concluded that the plaintiff had 
produced sufficient summary judgment evidence to merit 
consideration by a jury.510 
The judges who would have granted UNC’s motion for 
summary judgment considered contradicted and impeached 
evidence in favor of the movant, and they also relied on inferences 
in favor of the movant in finding the plaintiff’s requested 
inferences unreasonable as a matter of law.511 For example, they 
would have inferred that the coach’s frequent comments were 
lighthearted jokes,512 that the question “who are you fucking” 
showed concern that the plaintiff’s social life might be hurting her 
academic performance,513 and that the plaintiff’s distress at being 
cut from the soccer team showed that the impact of the coach’s 
 
 507.  340 F. Supp. 2d 666 (M.D.N.C. 2004), aff’d, 444 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2006), 
as amended on reh’g (June 8, 2006), and aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
Jennings v. Univ. of N. C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 508.  See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 691 (“Because Jennings was the non-movant 
in the summary judgment proceedings, we recite the facts, with reasonable 
inferences drawn, in her favor.”).  
 509.  Id. 
 510.  See id. at 701 (finding “Jennings ha[d] presented sufficient evidence to 
raise triable questions of fact on all disputed elements of her Title IX claim 
against UNC”). 
 511.  See id. at 724–25 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (observing that the coach’s 
long tenure as the head of the women’s team “makes any inference that Dorrance 
is generally hostile to young women soccer players . . . preposterous”). 
 512.  See id. at 719 (describing the coach’s behavior as “simple teasing”). 
 513.  See id. at 720 (“[I]t was, in context, obviously an inquiry about what was 
occupying Jennings’ time.”). 
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behavior on her was not severe.514 Those pro-movant inferences 
were quite likely influenced by the judges’ understanding of the 
nature of athletics and player-coach relationships.515 
The Supreme Court itself was guilty of considering 
pro-movant inferences in its notorious opinion in Scott v. Harris.516 
One fact issue required a decision about whether a fleeing driver 
was endangering the lives of others.517 The summary judgment 
record in that case included deposition testimony as well as a 
videotape of a police chase.518 The decision turned not on facts 
depicted on the video (e.g. “was it dark outside?”) but on the 
inferences that could or could not be drawn from its depiction of 
the chase.519 The trial court and Eleventh Circuit opinions 
concluded that a reasonable jury could infer facts and reach 
conclusions in favor of the driver: he posed no threat prior to the 
chase, and during the chase he posed little or no threat to 
pedestrians or other motorists (the roads were largely empty and 
he remained in control of his vehicle).520 In contrast, Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court rejected any such 
inferences as unreasonable as a matter of law, instead drawing the 
inference in favor of the police officer who rammed the fleeing 
driver’s vehicle.521 “Far from being the cautious and controlled 
 
 514.  See id. at 723, 725 (claiming Jennings pursued the lawsuit out of “anger 
and disappointment in being cut”). 
 515.  See id. at 724  
If Dorrance was then the coach of the men’s soccer team, he would just 
as surely have teased his male players about their weekends with their 
girlfriends as he lightly teased Jennings about her weekend with her 
boyfriend. Such teasing about a player’s social life is the norm on any 
collegiate athletic team, whether male or female. 
 516.  550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 517.  See id. at 378 (stating the first task in this case was “to determine the 
relevant facts”). 
 518.  Id.  
 519.  See id. at 379–80 (describing the driver in the video “racing,” 
“swerv[ing],” “run[ning] multiple red lights,” and driving “shockingly fast,” and 
concluding that the driving created “a great risk of serious injury”). 
 520.  See id. at 378–79 (“Indeed, reading the lower court’s opinion, one gets the 
impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was attempting to 
pass his driving test.”); see also Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 815–16 (11th 
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (lower court record). 
 521.  See id. at 379–80 (asserting that the nonmoving party’s deposition was 
“blatantly contradicted by the record” and that “no reasonable jury could have 
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driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more 
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most 
frightening sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders 
alike at great risk of serious injury.”522 Given his interpretation of 
the events depicted on the video, Justice Scalia chose the inference 
suggested by the movant police officer—the fleeing driver was 
endangering officers and members of the public—and therefore the 
nonmovant’s contrary inference was not reasonable.523 One can 
hope that this type of analysis is limited to cases involving 
videotape, as it does not purport to change the general rules of 
summary judgment analysis. 
Improved awareness of proper summary judgment analysis 
could help avoid judges’ reliance on their own personal inferences 
to take cases away from juries. We would not need to wonder about 
the impact of differences in the experience of working mothers and 
working fathers (and societal attitudes toward both) on the trial 
and appellate judges in Chadwick.524 We would not have to worry 
that different experiences with team sports, coaches, and “locker 
room talk” would lead to different inference preferences where the 
judge’s choice controls.525 Similarly, a plaintiff’s access to a jury 
trial would not be heavily influenced by whether a judge grew up 
driving on two-lane roads.526 
Important policies underlie Rule 56’s requirement that judges 
look at the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to 
 
believed him”). 
 522.  Id. at 380. 
 523.  See id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion 
“presumes its own version of the facts”). Justice Stevens’ dissent calls the majority 
on its improper summary judgment analysis, and also suggests that the Justices’ 
experience may have influenced their inferences. See id. at 390 n.1 
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two 
or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or 
explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming 
by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most 
high-speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on 
superhighways—when split-second judgments about the risk of 
passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine—they 
might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately. 
 524.  See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing Chadwick). 
 525.  See supra notes 507–515 and accompanying text. 
 526.  See supra notes 516–523 and accompanying text. 
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the nonmovant.527 The result of a denial of summary judgment is 
a case that proceeds to a jury determination.528 In addition to its 
Seventh Amendment significance, decisions by a multi-member 
jury may be better able to overcome the heuristics and biases 
discussed in this Article. Its broader array of experiences and 
“common sense” make this possible.529 “[T]he controlled process of 
trial and the forced deliberation of lay jurors could provide a 
powerful antidote to not only overt biases and prejudices but also 
to the more subtle warping of perception and rational thought that 
stems from cognitive illiberalism and its cousins.”530 
When restricting analysis to the proper parts of the record and 
to inferences in favor of the nonmovant, a judge’s role with respect 
to inferences is still very important, but its function is more 
narrowly defined.531 It also has the advantage of keeping the focus 
outside of the judge’s own personal probability assessment, 
reminding the judge that other people with different experiences 
can draw different but reasonable inferences.532 This approach 
might in some cases lead to increased costs to the litigants and the 
court because the litigation will continue, and the cost is more 
worrisome when the movant ultimately prevails.533 However, these 
costs must be balanced against potential advantages of avoiding 
the dismissal of meritorious claims, the costs of successful appeals, 
 
 527.  See Stempel, supra note 68, at 631 (“The very premise of summary 
judgment is that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and that no 
reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant, and the law is so clear that there is 
no valid reason to postpone entry of judgment.”). 
 528.  See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 
(2000). 
 529.  See Stempel, supra note 68, at 684 (asserting that judge-driven rejections 
of claims may have Seventh Amendment violation implications). 
 530.  Id. at 680. See generally Kahan et al., supra note 3. 
 531.  See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 57 (1949) (restating the rule 
that judges may only look at the inferences in favor of the nonmovant when 
deciding whether to submit an issue to the jury). 
 532.  See Stempel, supra note 68, at 634 (asserting that judges are not good at 
imagining conclusions drawn by a person with a different background); see 
generally Kahan et al., supra note 3.  
 533.  But see Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 689, 689 (2012) (theorizing that denial of a motion for summary 
judgment both saves court costs and creates a “settlement premium” for the 
nonmovant). 
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the importance of access to the courts, and the constitutional role 
of the jury as fact finder.534 
3. Develop a Record that Supports a Richer Narrative 
a. Pleadings 
Since the end of the twentieth century, the trend in civil 
procedure has been to worry about costs and efficiency at the 
expense of other values.535 As part of this trend, rule amendments 
and changes to interpretation of existing rules have restricted 
available procedures.536 Among other things, dismissals on the 
pleading and the granting of summary judgment have been made 
easier and the scope of discovery has been limited.537 All of these 
forces have resulted in decisions based on a sparser factual 
record– what one scholar has called “narrative-erasing 
procedure.”538 The function of the civil justice system depends on 
competing narratives, and narrative richness helps decision 
makers choose from a fuller array of possibilities.539  
Because as a group judges are highly educated and very often 
members of a political or social elite, they may not share the 
 
 534.  See Stempel, supra note 68, at 632 (“More likely is that the aggressive 
use of summary judgment costs society more than would a procedural code with 
no summary judgment mechanism.”); Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing 
Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 573, 607–08 (2018) (noting the ample scholarship on the 
decline of trial in civil cases and restrictive nature of current civil procedure). 
 535.  See Ralph, supra note 534, at 607–08 (arguing that restrictive trends in 
civil procedure limit access to courts for marginalized populations and impede 
individual litigants’ rights to be heard in a neutral forum). 
 536.  Id. 
 537.  See id. at 609 (addressing the heightened pleading standard created by 
Twombly and Iqbal); id. at 614 (asserting the proportionality addition in the scope 
of discovery rule is too burdensome). 
 538.  See generally id. “Narrative” in this sense means “a particular 
representation of a series of events: a text or other embodiment of a certain telling 
or treatment of a story’s events.” Id. at 577. A narrative is not the same thing as 
a “story.” Id. It is, rather, the telling of the events from some particular 
perspective. Id. 
 539. See id. at 589 (pointing to the relationship between competing narratives 
and law in the trial setting). 
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same “stock stories” with the litigants from outsider groups who 
appear before them. But we know narratives can create 
empathy and persuade in a way that cold logic or impersonal 
data cannot.540 
More information can lead to better inferences and more 
evenhanded results. Plaintiffs who do have access to a richer set of 
facts, then, should realize their narrative potential and plead the 
underlying story.541 Providing a more complete and full-bodied set 
of narratives can help judges combat automatic heuristic 
responses.542 For example, judges considering plausibility of 
pleadings may, if not given more information, rely on their own 
narratives—those that their heuristics generate.543 “Given the 
privileged position of judges, who tend to be well educated and 
politically elite, [they may] unconsciously apply a master-narrative 
that differs radically from the narratives that . . . members of 
marginalized groups may wish to tell.”544 In order to increase the 
probability that the judge will be able to make decisions on a more 
information-rich record, procedure rules should be made and 
interpreted to discourage dismissal on the pleadings without an 
opportunity to do discovery. 
Inferences are gap-fillers, and a record containing a more 
complete collection of circumstantial evidence can better inform 
the inference-drawing process. “The more gap filling and 
inferential thinking that a judge has to engage in, the more room 
there may be for explicit and implicit biases to structure the judge’s 
assessment in the absence of a well-developed evidentiary 
record.”545 Some of the additional information can provide the 
 
 540.  Id. at 619. 
 541.  See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of 
Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 811–14 (1995) (urging the use of 
narratives in pleadings as a means to persuade); see generally Elizabeth Fajans 
& Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2009) (instructing practitioners to go beyond the “bare-
bones form-book” pleading and incorporate storytelling techniques when drafting 
complaints to provide a meaningful translation of the plaintiff’s experience and 
“evok[e] in the reader a desire that justice be done”). 
 542.  See Eastman, supra note 541, at 812 (suggesting that narrative is a tool 
to counteract presuppositions and increase understanding of clients’ realities). 
 543.  See id. at 813–14 (explaining the role that heuristics play). 
 544.  Ralph, supra note 535, at 612. 
 545.  Id. 
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judge with facts that fall outside his or her experience, and it may 
even alert the judge to perspectives other than his or her own. The 
larger set of information inputs can also cue System 2 effortful 
thinking, increasing the chances that an inference will be 
deliberate rather than automatic.546 
b. Discovery 
Discovery decisions are the other significant procedural 
context that could improve inferences by providing a factually 
more complete record.547 Inferences come into the discovery picture 
because much of the information sought may be circumstantial 
rather than direct evidence.548 A party seeking discovery may be 
asking the court to order production of material that arguably 
supports an inference. For example, in a sex discrimination case 
involving John Doe’s intent, the discovery sought might be not “I 
heard John Doe say that he fired the plaintiff because she was 
female” but “John Doe regularly tells sexist jokes to male 
employees.” As was true in the cases described in Parts III and IV, 
the discovery relevance decision turns on whether the judge 
believes an inference from circumstantial evidence to the fact of 
consequence to the action is sufficiently significant to satisfy Rule 
26(b).549 
In order to encourage discovery that will provide the court and 
the parties with a more complete narrative, judges drawing 
inferences can keep in mind the way the procedure and evidence 
 
 546.  See Blinking, supra note 37, at 15 (postulating that judges did better on 
a more difficult CRT problem because more difficult problems suggest “to the test 
taker that reliance on intuition might be unwise”). 
 547.  Just as narratives can be created at the pleading stage, broader discovery 
can also provide parties with the information needed to present narratives in 
motions throughout the litigation cycle. See Eastman, supra note 541, at 811–14 
 548.  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 76–77 (pointing out that despite 
the technical difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, no evidence 
is truly “direct” because “every argument can be further decomposed to reveal 
new sources of doubt or uncertainty”). 
 549.  For a discussion of how a judge’s determination of the importance of an 
inference to a party’s claims can affect discovery rulings, see supra Part III.C. For 
real-life cases illustrating this dynamic, see supra Part IV.B. 
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rules talk about relevance.550 “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”551 The language of the evidence rule 
makes it clear that the test should not require the discovering 
party to convince the judge that the requested information is 
sufficient to support an inference that is more probable than not.552 
Rather, the information to be discovered is relevant if it makes the 
inference more probable than it would be without the 
information.553 The rule as written, then, encourages the judge to 
allow discovery of a broader set of information, and that 
information in turn can better inform the inference to be made on 
the merits.554 
Judges considering discovery requests should be aware that 
fact investigation, particularly when it is done by those with little 
initial information, may take the form of abductive reasoning.555 
“Abductive reasoning” can be defined as “[a] creative process of 
using known data to generate hypotheses to be tested by further 
investigation.”556 From the information available at a particular 
point in time, the discovering party may generate a hypothesis.557 
If that hypothesis is correct, then the information sought should 
exist, and the discovery request is aimed at finding it.558 Rather 
than rejecting such requests out of hand as speculative or 
 
 550.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“[P]arties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of 
the issues at stake in the action . . . [and] the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 551.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 552.  Id. 401(a). 
 553.  Id. 
 554.  See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note (recognizing that even 
evidence “essentially background in nature . . . is universally offered and 
admitted as an aid to understanding”). 
 555.  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 54–58 (noting that the acquisition 
of additional evidence during fact investigation—especially in the early 
stages— often requires parties to use abduction to build off the information 
available to them). 
 556.  Id. at 379. 
 557.  See id. at 56 (“[Abduction] involves reasoning from the evidence to a 
hypothesis that might explain it.”).  
 558.  Id. at 57. 
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irrelevant, judges should entertain the possibility that inferential 
links between the information at hand, the hypothesis, and the 
information sought may be convincing. 
The proportionality factors emphasized by the 2015 
amendments to the discovery rules can also be problematic with 
respect to the impact of judges’ own experiences and biases.559 It is 
unlikely that they will be removed from the rules, but their 
application can be done with care, and with attention to the 
possible impact of non-universal generalizations. When the rule 
was adopted, the Advisory Committee left the question of burdens 
of proof somewhat ambiguous.560 The Advisory Committee note, 
though, provides both that “the [rule] change does not place on the 
party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all 
proportionality considerations” and that a “party claiming undue 
burden or expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps 
the only information—with respect to that part of the 
determination.”561 Judges considering proportionality issues can 
avoid reliance on generalizations growing out of their own 
pre-bench practice experience by requiring parties to produce 
evidence to support the inferences relating to factors that are 
objective and measurable.562 Similarly, judges should be acutely 
aware of the possibility of generalizations that differ from those 
that they access most readily.563 Finally, for those proportionality 
factors that are inherently normative, judges should consciously 
summon and consider competing policy values.564 
 
 559.  See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and 
Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1109–18 (2016) 
(discussing the six Rule 26(b) proportionality factors and the way a judge’s 
subjective judgments enter the analysis). 
 560.  See, e.g., AGENDA BOOK OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 206 
(Apr. 10–11, 2014), https://perma.cc/U76Q-UW37 (PDF) (noting that Rule 26 still 
“does not specify which party bears the burden of proof”). 
 561. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. 
 562.  See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 559, at 1111–18 (clarifying the 
extent to which each of the six proportionality factors is objective and measurable, 
and listing specific questions that judges can ask to evaluate each). 
 563.  See supra Parts V.C–D (discussing the ways in which judges draw from 
their professional experiences and implicit biases to create often improper mental 
shortcuts). 
 564.  See Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 559, at 1116–18 (suggesting that 
judges balance the proportionality factors against employment practices, free 
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Rule 26(b)(1) should be interpreted and applied with a policy 
slant in favor of production, and this may in some cases increase 
costs for the producing party. It is nevertheless an important 
analytical starting point. Any increased out-of-pocket costs need to 
be considered in light of the benefits of further discovery that 
greater accuracy in decision making could bring to private 
litigation’s function as an enforcer of legal norms.565 
VII. Conclusion 
When it comes to inferences, judges—like people 
everywhere—should approach the task with great humility.566 
Despite best intentions, non-conscious mental shortcuts are 
working away, providing the human mind with information and 
intuitions that are skewed by each person’s individual experiences. 
Our very senses can deceive us, influenced by our social and 
cultural commitments and helped along even by more deliberative 
thought. While the cases discussed in this Article, and many of the 
studies of judicial behavior, have focused on difficult and 
important issues such as race, gender, and politics, there is no 
reason to think that cognitive shortcuts do not affect all types of 
decisions in all types of cases. 
 
speech, and other matters that “may have importance far beyond the monetary 
amount involved”). 
 565.  See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 6–10 (2010) (characterizing private lawsuits to 
enforce legislation as essential to legal infrastructure in the United States); 
Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 71–72 (2010) (discussing the importance 
of private parties’ assisting government agencies in the enforcement of 
substantive law); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and 
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1289–94 (1982) (discussing the necessity 
of private rights of action for the enforcement of substantive law). 
 566.  By using this term, this Article does not mean to pull in the full body of 
academic research and theorizing regarding intellectual humility. It is 
noteworthy, however, that this work is consistent with much of the scholarship 
cited regarding cognitive and social psychology and with theories of cultural 
cognition. See generally MARK R. LEARY, JOHN TEMPLETON FOUND., THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (2018), https://perma.cc/V7FU-QPP9 
(PDF). Leary defines intellectual humility as “recognizing that a particular 
personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an appropriate attentiveness to 
limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to one’s own limitations in 
obtaining and evaluating relevant information.” Id. at 1–2. 
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Yet fact finding, including the drawing of inferences, is an 
integral part of the judicial system. It is not confined to juries, or 
even trials, but is instead a pervasive part of the pretrial period. 
These important decisions set the parameters for litigation success 
and failure. The more we learn from psychologists about the 
operation of our minds, the less tenable it becomes to stick with 
the fiction that inferences are purely a matter of neutral logic. The 
real nature of inference-drawing needs to be confronted. 
The Federal Judicial Center is to be commended for the 
education efforts it has already undertaken, and for including 
social cognition as a judicial competency. Yet its programs require 
systemic partners. Knowledge of the issue and tools that encourage 
reflection must be coupled with efforts to motivate judges to avoid 
relying too heavily on their individual experiences and with the 
creation of structures that require effortful deliberation. Finally, 
changes in the way the procedural rules are interpreted and 
applied could improve the quality of judicial inferences, preserve 
the power of juries to choose among reasonable inferences, and 
enhance the depth of the factual record on which those juries will 
make their decisions. There is no magic bullet to avoid the 
challenge of humans using human cognition, but we can avoid 
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